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This thesis explores how, why and at what we laugh today. A quick review of the 
books, movies and TV shows nowadays would reveal that we now laugh not only at 
others, but more prominently at ourselves; in particular, we laugh at ourselves in 
unhappy, distressing and embarrassing situations. This curious characteristic of the 
laughter of our time makes it an important and worthy subject of study. 
Like all aspects of human existence, our laughter was changed by the two world 
wars in the past century. In the aftermath of the senseless destruction, it would seem 
that laughter was impossible. Nevertheless, together with the rise of the Theatre of the 
Absurd in the period emerged a new laughter, known as the risus purus, a mirthless 
laugh that is directed at the self. This thesis studies two important plays of absurdist 
theatre, namely Samuel Beckett's Endgame and Harold Pinter's The Birthday Party. 
This is not only to find out how the risus purus is induced in the theatre, but also its 
purpose, if there is one, and whether we should continue laughing so painfully. 
The study of these two plays shows that, while both playwrights approach the 
risus purus differently, they have come to the same conclusion that it is a laugh of 
recognition, built on an increased knowledge of the self and its relation to others and 
the world. It is no doubt a difficult laugh, because self-discovery, especially in these 
circumstances, is often an unhappy process. However, while the risus purus may not 
be the solution to the absurd condition, it is part and parcel of being human in this age. 
The risus purus being a laugh of recognition, it is important for people to first 
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"Man is the only animal that laughs and weeps," claims William Hazlitt, "for he is 
the only animal that is struck with the difference between what things are and what 
they ought to be” (5). Laughter has been recognized as a defining feature of homo 
sapiens since the time of Aristotle, and indeed, while certain animals display similar 
facial expressions or emit laughter-like sounds, in no other animal is laughter as 
complicated as it is in humans. As the second half of Hazlitt's quote makes clear, 
human laughter is not simply physiological, but involves intellectual perception as 
well as an emotional response to the said perception. The complexity of laughter can 
be seen in the greatly diverse situations in which laughter occurs. In his book Taking 
Laughter Seriously, John Morreall lists a number of things that people laugh at: 
"Tickling," "Peekaboo (in babies)," "Hearing a joke," "Seeing someone in odd-
looking clothes," "Hearing clever insults," and so on (1-2). Clearly, laughter is not 
only associated with human emotions, but with human's societies and cultures. It is 
on the one hand inborn, and on the other hand something one learns in time. Through 
the norms of his community, a man learns what is laughable, and when and at whom 
it is appropriate to laugh. In short, laughter is an integral part of human life, closely 
related to man historically, socially and culturally. 
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For a long time, the crucial subject of laughter has been ignored or dismissed. One 
of the reasons is that laughter has always been linked with the less noble aspects of 
human nature, including frivolity and contempt. Plato says, “[P]ersons of worth, even 
if only mortal men, must not be represented as overcome by laughter, and still less 
must such a representation of the gods be allowed" {Republic 64). Because no self-
respecting man would indulge in the activity of laughing, laughter, in his opinion, is a 
subject unworthy of being represented, let alone being philosophized. Given that 
laughing is inseparable from the human experience, Plato's strong opposition against 
laughter was eventually replaced by other theories, but his impression of laughing as a 
depraved and derogatory behavior has remained influential. Furthermore, even though 
many theories of laughter have emerged since Plato's time, not one of them could 
satisfactorily explain every idiosyncratic case of laughter. The vastness and 
complexity of the subject mean that finding an all-encompassing theory of laughter is 
out of the question; as Simon Critchley suggests, "[Humour] is a nicely impossible 
object for a philosopher" (2). Nevertheless, despite—and perhaps because of—this 
fact, laughter remains one of the most important topics to be studied. While a 
completely inclusive analysis of every single case of laughter is impossible, the study 
of the laughter of a certain period can shed light on the human condition of that 
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particular time and place. With the goal of better understanding our own period, this 
research limits itself to examining the laughter of our times. 
Laughter and the Theatre 
In many ways, the theatre provides an ideal setting for the study of laughter. The 
play is, first and foremost, an art meant to be performed in front of an audience. 
Critics have noted that the more collective experience of watching a play一compared 
to, for example, reading a novel—produces stronger and more observable laughter 
(Buckley 18; Morreall 114). It is therefore unsurprising that there have always been 
forms of drama designed especially to induce laughter, grouped under the umbrella of 
"comedy." Laughter, being contagious, finds the theatre its most natural stage. To 
successfully make a large group of people laugh, a play must include jokes and 
witticisms easily understood and accepted by the audience at the time. It also 
visualizes humour through the presence of the actors on stage. Following such clues 
as a character's costume, antics and language, the audience is able to identify at whom 
they should laugh. In this way, the play is able to reflect, record and modify the 
standard of humour of any given period. Thus, it is an important literary form to 
consider in the study of laughter, and it is to the play that this research shall turn. 
The Twentieth Century and Tragicomedy 
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Because the play is so closely related with laughter, in order to understand the 
laughter of our time, we must first examine the theatre of our time. Before doing so, 
we must look at the historical and theoretical backgrounds in which these plays were 
produced. The twentieth century witnessed the greatest and fastest change in the way 
humans lived in history, due to scientific, technological, political and social 
developments. While most of these changes benefited humankind, they also enabled 
unprecedented catastrophe, especially the two world wars. In their aftermath, all 
foundational beliefs of human society, including religion, science, the idea of progress, 
even the basic good of humanity, were shaken. As Eric Levy argues, "The real Fall 
occurred not in Eden but in our century. After the accumulation of too much history, 
we have lost the innocence required to believe in any more explanations" (qtd. in 
Pattie 158). This sense of mistrust towards history and established institutions 
characterizes Modernism, a broad term that encompasses the many responses to this 
historical period. It is furthermore accompanied by a sense of confusion and 
uncertainty, as the rug was pulled from under man's feet. John Orr explains that, in 
these circumstances, man cannot be certain even of himself: 
Self-knowledge, it was assumed, could model itself on science and 
learn from its discoveries. But many forms of scientific enquiry in our 
century have shown us how little we know, and how each new 
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discovery can expand the gaps that remain, while the new discoveries 
in weapons technology have led to the potential destruction of the 
planet. (4) 
Sorely aware that old approaches were no longer adequate, Modernists strove to 
develop new forms to comprehend the new reality they faced. Therefore, Modernism 
represents a two-fold impulse that reacts against the established order and searches for 
new ways to cope with the changed human condition. 
Of specific relevance to this thesis, Modernist theatre, more than theatre of other 
times, takes up the form of tragicomedy. As the name suggests, it brings together the 
two polar opposites of tragedy and comedy. Aristotle defines tragedy as "a process of 
imitating an action which has serious implications, is complete, and possesses 
magnitude; by means of language which has been made sensuously attractive," and 
comedy as "an imitation of persons who are inferior; not, however, going all the way 
to full villainy, but imitating the ugly, of which the ludicrous is one part" {Poetics 23, 
25). Since the subjects these two forms portray are so different, and the effect they 
aim at so contrary to one another, the mixture of the two has been frowned upon 
traditionally. Sir Philip Sidney declares in The Defence of Poesie that tragicomedies 
are 
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gross absurdities, ...neither right tragedies nor right comedies, 
mingling kings and clowns, not because the matter so carrieth it but 
thrust in the clown by head and shoulders to play a part in majestical 
matters, with neither decency nor discretion; so as neither the 
admiration and commiseration, nor the right sportfulness is by their 
mongrel tragicomedy obtained. (67-68) 
The main objection Sidney has against tragicomedy is that the mixing of tragedy and 
comedy fails to produce the "right" emotions for either subject matter. However, in 
the twentieth century, tragicomedy has taken over the stage. "We accept," says David 
Hirst, "as the theatrical norm such genres as black comedy, comedy of menace and 
savage farce" (xi). This change in taste signifies that the condition of our time calls 
for a new emotional response. The massive destruction of the two world wars brings 
to light the fact that while death is tragic, at the same time it can happen so arbitrarily 
that it defies our common sense, and has the potential to shock us into laughter. As J. 
L. Styan suggests, "If a tile falls off a roof and kills me, it is much the same as if an 
atomic bomb had been dropped" (218). Against the backdrop of such random and 
sudden tragedy, the comic aspect of man's futile effort to survive lies plainly in sight. 
Tragicomedy, by bringing together traditionally conflicting genres, questions the way 
the human condition was represented in the past; in doing so, it unsettles the 
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audience's position to "deliver a specific kind of verdict" (Orr 4). The ambiguous 
response thus produced fits the uncertainty that permeates the period. 
The Absurd Condition and the Theatre of the Absurd 
It was under this tragicomic atmosphere that Albert Camus asked, in his work The 
Myth of Sisyphus, if the world had lost its meaning, whether continuing to live was 
absurd and suicide the logical conclusion to an absurd existence. In everyday usage, 
the word "absurd" means something that goes against reason or logic; something that 
is ridiculous. However, for Camus, the absurd is a more complicated concept. He 
writes, "A world that can be explained even with bad reasons is a familiar world. But, 
on the other hand, in a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an 
alien, a stranger.. .This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is 
properly the feeling of absurdity" (13). Later, it is emphasized again that the absurd 
entails a feeling of exile or not being at home: "the Absurd is not in man.. .nor in the 
world，but in their presence together" (Camus 34). That is to say, the absurd does not 
pertain to the world or man alone, but the mismatch between the two. The absurd 
world is not governed by reason but by forces and fates beyond human control, and 
living is an endless, useless task that humans perform to put off the end. An example 
Camus gives of the absurd is when a man charges a group of machine guns with only 
a sword; just as under-equipped, man tackles life in an equally absurd fashion (33). 
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Camus finishes his treatise with the myth of Sisyphus. Sisyphus, a mortal who has 
attempted to overcome death by imprisoning it, is punished by the gods to roll a large 
stone up a mountain everyday, only to see it roll back down by the evening and start 
again the next day. Subject to fates as random and fickle as the gods, humans are 
doomed to repeat their futile routines until the end comes. Written in 1942 at the 
height of the Second World War, The Myth of Sisyphus expresses an attitude, not 
illogically, bom out of an era when all previous values and reasons were shattered. 
Using Camus's idea of the absurd, Martin Esslin categorized the many plays 
produced during and after the Second World War under the name "the Theatre of the 
Absurd." Esslin identifies many playwrights as belonging to the Theatre of the 
Absurd, but is cautious to point out that they do not form any school or movement, 
because each of them "is an individual who regards himself as a lone outsider, cut off 
and isolated in his private world" (22). These playwrights include Samuel Beckett, 
Arthur Adamov, Eugene lonesco, Jean Genet, and Harold Pinter, to name a few. Their 
works share the common theme of depicting "a universe deprived of what was once 
its centre and its living purpose, a world deprived of a generally accepted integrating 
principle, which has become disjointed, purposeless—absurd" (Esslin 399). To 
express the human experience in this newly absurd universe, the Theatre of the 
Absurd employs new radical methods, such as "the open abandonment of rational 
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devices and discursive thought," as well as the use of fragmentary, trite and 
contradictory language (Esslin 25, 26). Because of these features, the Theatre of the 
Absurd is often considered strange and difficult to watch. Nevertheless, these plays 
received enormous success within a short period of time. No doubt, as Esslin points 
out, this is because the Theatre of the Absurd "most sensitively mirrors and reflects 
the preoccupations and anxieties, the emotions and thinking of many of [these 
playwrights'] contemporaries in the Western world" (22). Hence, it provides an 
important framework for us to consider plays of this period. 
The Absurd Laugh 
Returning to our topic of laughter, the obvious question to be asked is: what does 
the laughter of the Theatre of the Absurd sound like? Reviewing Endgame, a play by 
the representative dramatist of the Theatre of the Absurd Samuel Beckett, Harold 
Clurman writes, "Samuel Beckett's Endgame...is a Mystery of final things: as death, 
the end of an age. Being altogether modern, it is also a comedy. We do not weep in 
the theater nowadays over futility, protracted dreariness or doom; we laugh" (118). 
Reflecting Modernist uncertainty, the laughter produced by the Theatre of the Absurd 
is constantly accompanied by the concern that, if the human condition has indeed 
become absurd in our time, it may not be possible to continue to laugh. Camus gives 
an example of how the absurd may be found funny: “At certain moments of lucidity. 
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the mechanical aspect of their gestures, their meaningless pantomime makes silly 
everything that surrounds them. A man is talking on the telephone behind a glass 
partition; you cannot hear him but you see his incomprehensible dumb-show: you 
wonder why he is alive" (21). Human actions, having no bearing on man's survival in 
an absurd world, are no more than "pantomime" or a "dumb-show." Only at 
"moments of lucidity," or when life is recognized as absurd, is the comic dimension 
of life revealed. Laughter is possible when uncertainty is dispelled and the absurd 
world is recognized as such. 
Striving to present humanity's absurd condition on stage and to arouse the 
laughter of self-recognition, the Theatre of the Absurd could be said to be on a 
mission. Orr argues that, paradoxically, continual human effort while acknowledging 
said effort to be futile is the key to overcoming futility: 
[P]art of the modernist outrage is to show us that such horror cannot 
abolish laughter...The gap between aspiration and deed, the bedrock of 
modem humour, is at its strongest as tragicomedy shows us in a world 
of victims. Its heroes are at times pathetic creatures, but through 
aspirations which will not die they still achieve a genuine pathos we 
cannot take away from them. (6) 
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Tragicomedy, which the Theatre of the Absurd adopts as its main mode of operation, 
enables the audience to realize that the absurd world acted out on stage mirrors their 
own condition. During the course of a play, the audience connects with the characters 
on stage. The nature of this connection greatly differs in tragedy and comedy. To 
achieve its pathos, tragedy must include characters the audience sympathizes with, 
because "sympathy involves...a sense of going out of ourselves, but, at the same time, 
putting ourselves on stage" (Bennett and Royle 107, emphasis in original). Only when 
the audience sympathizes with, thereby stepping into the shoes of, the tragic hero, 
may it be affected with sorrow as the hero languishes on stage in the face of cruel fate. 
In contrast, comedy requires an indifferent audience. Unlike in tragedy, the ill fortune 
of characters in comedy serves to make the audience laugh. Henri Bergson maintains 
that, "Indifference is [laughter's] natural environment, for laughter has no greater foe 
than emotion. I do not mean that we could not laugh at a person who inspires us with 
pity. ..but in such a case we must, for the moment, put our affection out of court and 
impose silence upon our pity" (4). Hence, to be moved to laughter, the audience of 
comedy must remain aloof and unsympathetic to the characters on stage. 
Tragicomedy, half tragedy and half comedy, produces a curious fusion of their 
impacts on the audience. In one moment the audience is invited to identify with the 
pitiable characters, but in the next it is asked to laugh at their strange antics and 
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circumstances. In effect, tragicomedy asks its audience to laugh at itself. The instant 
the audience puts aside its pity and is spurred into laughter, Critchley argues, "[its] 
defenses... drop momentarily. We realize in an instant that the object of laughter is the 
subject who laughs" (49-50). In the same way, laughter of the Theatre of the Absurd 
is turned inward. As the audience realizes that its situation一paying large sums of 
money to be crammed into a darkened hall to watch meaningless acts being 
performed一is no less absurd than that on stage, laughter rings out against itself. 
Research Objectives 
Having briefly looked at some characteristics of the laughter of our days, this 
research now sets out to examine the topic in greater detail. In his novel Watt, Beckett 
identifies three kinds of laughter: 
The bitter laugh laughs at that which is not good, it is the ethical laugh. The 
hollow laugh laughs at that which is not true, it is the intellectual laugh. Not 
good! Not true! Well well. But the mirthless laugh is the dianoetic laugh, 
down the snout — Haw! - so. It is the laugh of laughs, the risus purus, the 
laugh laughing at the laugh, the beholding, saluting of the highest joke, in a 
word the laugh that laughs — silence please - at that which is unhappy. (48) 
The last laugh, "the laugh laughing at the laugh," clearly describes the self-reflexive 
laugh of our time. It is placed at the end of the list, following the bitter laugh and the 
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hollow laugh. This implies a sense of development as well as value judgment: because 
the "highest joke" is only beheld when all other jokes are told, the laugh of 
recognition cannot be reached before the other laughs. Hence, an analysis of the self-
reflexive laugh must begin with an understanding of other kinds of laughter. The first 
chapter of this research includes an overview of the many theories of laughter. By 
studying how laughter and the way it is perceived have changed throughout history, 
we may better comprehend how our laughter has taken its form in this generation. 
Beckett's quote also provides an interesting name for our subject: "the risus 
purus," or the pure laugh. The self-reflexive laugh may be considered pure because it 
does not mock or make fun of others, but is directed only at oneself. Such laughter is, 
as Beckett points out, mirthless; it is the laugh a man makes as he sees his own misery. 
However, by calling such laughter pure, Beckett affirms that there is still a point to 
laugh, however unhappily, in an absurd world. In the second chapter, we shall observe 
the development of laughter in Beckett's texts, as it is laid out in the first chapter, and 
how, through this process of distillation, the risus purus is produced in his play 
Endgame. 
In many ways, the risus purus is a difficult laugh. Not only is it mirthless, but in 
order to laugh mirthlessly one must learn to laugh bitterly and hollowly, until one 
comes to the unhappy conclusion that all along the butt of the joke is none other than 
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oneself. Being difficult, it is also the last laugh. Beckett hints in his quote that the 
risus purus is always followed by silence. This silence is reflected in his increasingly 
minimalist plays, in which humour gradually disappears. However, if the risus purus 
is truly the last laugh, is the world to become laughter-less after it has been achieved? 
If so, is it still worth laughing? The answer to the first question seems to be negative; 
after over half a century, humans continue to laugh still. Harold Pinter, writing after 
Beckett, was faced with just the challenge of finding laughter, which seemed to have 
reached its logical end in Beckett's plays. While undeniably influenced by Beckett, 
Pinter is able to show through his different writing style and themes that there is more 
than one way to induce self-reflexive laughter in the theatre. In particular, his 
"comedies of menace" present a vision of what life would be like if people were 
unable to laugh at themselves, and lack the self-knowledge such laughter brings. In 
the final chapter, we shall turn to Pinter and his play The Birthday Party, and see that 
even if the risus purus would eventually come to an end, man must continue to laugh, 
for it is his only weapon in a menacing world. 
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Chapter 1: Laughter and Man 
Theorizing Laughter 
Common to the theories of laughter is perhaps the fact that almost every 
theorist starts by indicating that he is aware of the near-futile task ahead of him. Henri 
Bergson starts his treatise on laughter by defining it as a "little problem, which has a 
knack of baffling every effort, of slipping away and escaping only to bob up again, a 
pert challenge flung at philosophic speculation" (1). This feeling of hopelessness in 
the face of this subject seems to be derived from two reasons. First of all, theories of 
laughter often strive to be comprehensive enough to account for all situations in 
which laughter may arise. Sigmund Freud writes in the introduction to The Joke and 
Its Relation to the Unconscious that he wishes to integrate all previous insights on the 
subject "into an organic whole" (8). Bergson, as well, while claiming that he "shall 
not aim at imprisoning the comic spirit within a definition," immediately adds that 
"the comic spirit has a logic of its own, even in its wildest eccentricities"; the aim of 
his essay, naturally, is to expound this logic that underlies and unites all laughter (2). 
The task is daunting indeed when we consider the many diverse kinds of laughter. A 
theory that can explain all kinds of laughter risks being too general, thus losing its 
explanatory power, or losing its plausibility, as it stretches to encompass every 
idiosyncratic case of laughter. Fortunately, a useful theory does not have to be able to 
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shed light on all comers of the subject. A theory can be important and valid even if it 
works with only a small or partial scope of the whole subject matter, especially when 
said subject matter is laughter, the physical manifestation of possibly hundreds of 
impulses. Therefore, while these theories are not "complete" and may even contradict 
one another, there is no doubting their contribution to our current understanding of 
laughter. In this sense, it is certainly possible to theorize about laughter, even if just a 
part of it. 
Another difficulty one faces when theorizing laughter is the feeling that no 
analysis can effectively capture laughter. Fredric Jameson writes, "So pleasure, we are 
told, like happiness or interest, can never be fixed directly by the naked eye - let alone 
pursued as an end, or conceptualized - but only experienced laterally, or after the fact, 
as something like the by-product of something else" (2: 62). Like pleasure, laughter is 
only meant to be experienced, not talked about. A joke explained is a joke ruined, and 
so a theory explaining why certain situations may induce laughter seems doomed to 
inevitable failure. The fact that a theory may not be risible itself and that it has spoilt 
the very thing it attempts to explain are some of the contentions a theory of laughter 
faces. Nevertheless, there is no question that for laughter to arise, certain conditions 
must be met. A theory, different in purpose and strategy from a joke, is not able nor 
expected to meet all these conditions. That is not to say that any theory of laughter 
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necessarily falls wide of the mark. Just as a theory of fear is not meant to scare its 
readers, a theory of laughter can make valid comments on the subject without making 
its readers laugh. While elusive, laughter is not impossible to examine. 
In spite of the premonition that their task would be a thankless one, the 
theorists of laughter persevered, or, in Freud's case, decided that the topic would be 
"worth the trouble" (9). The reason is simply this: laughter has been intimately tied 
with man historically and socially since the beginning of time. As Bergson puts 
eloquently: 
[The comic spirit] dreams...but it conjures up, in its dreams, visions that are 
at once accepted and understood by the whole of a social group. Can it then 
fail to throw light for us on the way that human imagination works, and 
more particularly social, collective, and popular imagination? Begotten of 
real life and akin to art, should it not also have something of its own to tell 
us about art and life? (2-3) 
As a form of social agreement, laughter is integral to our understanding of the 
existence of any particular group of any particular time. Unexceptionally, the study of 
our laughter today will illuminate our current condition. It is with this belief and goal 
in mind that the following research begins. 
Different Theories of Laughter 
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In the introduction, we have seen that the laughter today is the risus purus, so 
called the "pure laugh" because it is self-reflexive and not directed at others. For a 
man to laugh at himself, he must realize what is laughable about himself; the risus 
purus is therefore closely related to self-recognition and a gaining of self-knowledge. 
Interestingly, in the past, laughter was almost always associated with a lack of self-
knowledge. Baudelaire stresses that laughter is a sign of "ignorance and weakness," 
even of madness: 
Laughter comes from delusion also on the part of the one who laughs: 
Laughter comes from the idea of one's superiority. A Satanic idea, if ever 
there was one! And what pride and delusion! For it is a notorious fact that 
all madmen in asylums have an excessively overdeveloped idea of their 
own superiority: I hardly know of any who suffer from the madness of 
humility. Note, too, that laughter is one of the most frequent and numerous 
expressions of madness, (qtd. in Weller 84) 
The paradox is, as we find others' overconfidence laughable, we are affected by the 
same misplaced belief in our own superiority. The act of laughing, therefore, is a loop 
in which the person laughing and the person being laughed at are caught in, and 
eventually the two turn out to be one and the same. Shane Weller explains, 
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Laughter is possible only on the condition that the one who laughs fails to 
see that the other is no other~or, more precisely, that the self who laughs is 
already other than itself, fallen from the self it aberrantly takes itself to be. 
Paradoxically, then, no one can laugh at the self (as a laughing being), the 
madman least of all, even though, in fact, one can only laugh at oneself. 
(84-85) 
This realization, however, does not come easily. As shown in his quote, Beckett 
believes that the risus purus cannot occur before the bitter laugh and the hollow laugh. 
Different theories of laughter in history show that the understanding of laughter, or 
perhaps the very nature of laughter, has changed with time. John Morreall categorizes 
the theories of laughter into three main categories: the superiority theory, the 
incongruity theory, the relief theory. By studying these major theories, we will be able 
to see how humans laughed at the "not good," the "not true," and finally beheld the 
"highest joke," realizing that, in laughing, they shared in these qualities. 
The Superiority Theory 
The superiority theory argues that, when we perceive defects in another person 
and consequently finds ourselves superior, we laugh. In this sense, laughter is an 
expression of self-congratulation. It has even been suggested that it is "a controlled 
form of aggression" (Morreall 6). This theory of laughter dates as far back as to Plato, 
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and has troubled philosophers ever since. In Philebus, Plato identifies self-ignorance 
as the main risible subject; we laugh at people who delude themselves into thinking 
that they are wealthier, more handsome, or wiser than they really are (75). Since in 
laughing we are in effect delighting in someone else's weakness and indulging in 
"malice," Plato maintains that laughter causes "a pain in the soul" (75). For this 
reason, Plato believes that we should avoid laughing at all costs. In the Republic, 
Plato launches his infamous attack against poetry, or mimetic art. One of the reasons 
for his attack is that poetry appeals to the emotional side of human beings, which is 
defined as the baser part of their minds, in opposition to their rational capacity. Plato 
believes that constant exposure to poetry will cause one to become overly emotional 
and irrational in one's daily life, and thus is detrimental not only to the person but to 
the society as a whole. For instance, when watching a tragedy, the audience is moved 
to feel sorrow for the events on stage; Plato asserts, “[T]he best of us... delight in 
giving way to sympathy," and this causes one to cry out instead of being "quiet and 
patient" in the face of real-life tragedy {Republic 227). In the same way, Plato 
believes that laughter is dangerous to the individual as well as the society, stating, 
"There are jests which you would be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic 
stage, or indeed in private, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and 
are not at all disgusted at their unseemliness" {Republic 227). Like crying, laughter 
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has the ability to overtake a person and temporarily deprive him of his control over 
himself. The difference is, while tears merely symbolize emotional frailty, laughter 
symbolizes malevolence. Shown to promote malice, laughter is an ignoble act to be 
banished from Plato's perfect state. 
If we recall Beckett's quote earlier, the first kind of laughter he mentions 
"laughs at that which is not good, it is the ethical laugh." Plato may have shown how 
we laugh at things that are not good, but has definitely disagreed that such laughter is 
ethical. On the other hand, Aristotle believes that laughter does fulfill a moral 
function. In Poetics, Aristotle describes the proper subject matter for comedy is the 
"ludicrous": "The ludicrous, that is, is a falling or a piece of ugliness which causes no 
pain or destruction; thus, to go no farther, the comic mask is something ugly and 
distorted but painless" (23-24). From this, we can see that Aristotle agrees with Plato 
that the play is mimetic, but he does not consider mimesis as something negative. He 
points out that laughing at the ridiculous is not malicious but "painless," especially in 
a theatrical context where the laughter cannot do real harm. In fact, for Aristotle, 
laughter is called for in certain situations. In Nicomachean Ethics, he writes, "[Virtue] 
is a mean between two vices, one of excess, the other of deficiency. It is a mean also 
in that some vices fall short of what is right in feelings and actions, and others exceed 
it, while virtue both attains and chooses the mean" (31). Clearly, for Aristotle, virtue 
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involves finding the golden mean between two extremes. He applies this principle to 
laughter, saying, "The buffoon cannot resist a joke, sparing neither himself nor 
anyone else if he can raise a laugh... The boor is useless in such social intercourse. For 
he contributes nothing and takes objection to everything, even though relaxation and 
amusement are thought to be a necessary part of life" {Nicomachean 79). In 
Aristotle's view, great men should not restrain from laughter, as Plato has suggested, 
for that would make them boorish; instead, they should strive to be "quick-witted," 
laughing at appropriate things at appropriate times {Nicomachean 78). In addition, 
laughter has a morally corrective power. Plato has said that self-ignorance is evil and 
therefore risible; Aristotle adds that laughter serves as a sign to the target that he has a 
vice that he doesn't know of, and after being laughed at he can proceed to correct it. 
In The Morality of Laughter, F. H. Buckley explains that laughter promotes the 
Aristotelian mean: "Laughter always sanctions a butt's comic vice and reveals a 
correlative comic virtue that immunizes us from laughter" (10). For example, on each 
side of the comic virtue of "integrity" are the comic vices of "hypocrisy" and 
"misanthropy" (87). Laughter signals to the person being laughed at that he has an 
insufficient or excessive amount of integrity, and guides him back to the virtuous 
mean. Nevertheless, while Aristotle shows laughter to be necessary and even ethical 
in some situations, he maintains that "a joke is a kind of abuse" and that there are 
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jokes the truly witty person would not make {Nicomachean 79). He also laments that 
most people fall into the vice of buffoonery, "enjoy [ing] fun and jokes more than they 
should," and that true wits are few and far between {Nicomachean 78). In this he 
speaks in the same vein as Plato, warning that restraint must be exercised in 
connection with laughter. 
If Plato and Aristotle, to some extent, see laughter as a flaw that must be 
overcome or avoided, Thomas Hobbes takes it a step further. Hobbes argues that 
humans by nature are in constant struggle against one another. He famously declares, 
"I may therefore conclude, that the passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden 
glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by 
comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly" (4: 46, emphasis 
in original). Because weaknesses in others indicate an increase in our chance to win in 
the struggle, we laugh triumphantly at others' inferiority and for our own supposed 
superiority. Hobbes does not regard laughter as an expression of true joy (in separate 
accounts, he describes laughter as "grimaces" and "[a] distortion of countenance" 
respectively), and, understandably, expresses like Plato the concern that laughter 
signals and develops the baser nature of human beings (3: 46; 4: 45). He points out 
that laughter is most prominent in people who are aware of their inadequacy, and thus 
have to affirm their self-worth by observing and laughing at weaknesses in others; 
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great men, Hobbes asserts, "compare themselves only with the most able" and 
therefore have no cause to laugh (3: 46). The irony here, of course, is that that while 
laughter is used to express superiority, only the inferior indulges in laughter. 
For reasons mentioned above, derisive laughter has been considered tasteless 
and so has been censored by modern sensibility. That is not to say, however, that it. 
has disappeared; it has simply been disguised and evolved into many forms. One of 
these "modem" forms it has taken is related to our ultimate subject, the risus purus, 
and that is the laughter of ridiculing oneself (Morreall 8). But how can one feel 
superior to oneself? Quoting from another theorist, Albert Rapp, Morreall writes, "In 
laughing at yourself, the part of you that is laughing has dissociated itself from the 
part of you that is being laughed at" (8). The laughing self and the self being laughed 
at must be detached for such laughter to occur, because, as has been mentioned, 
laughter can only take place in an environment where affection is temporarily 
suspended. Hobbes also stresses that detachment is a prerequisite for laughing at 
oneself, saying that such laughter only occurs when follies in the past no longer 
"bring with them any present dishonor" (4:46). Accordingly, the object of this 
laughter is always the flawed self in the past, and this kind of laughter implies a better 
present self that has overcome its flaws. Undeniably, Hobbes' definition of self-
reflexive laughter does not fully explain our subject一the laughter of our time. It does 
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not allow for one to laugh at his present state, yet the absurd is not a condition that 
humans can overcome. Also, if one truly laughs at others to proclaim his triumph in 
the struggle among his fellow men, then what kind of triumph causes one to laugh at 
oneself? These important questions cannot be satisfactorily answered by Hobbes, as 
the single-minded association between laughter and ridicule at the time prevented him 
from exploring other possibilities of laughter. 
The Incongruity Theory 
The second type of laughter Beckett mentions is the laughter that laughs at 
that which is not "true," and intriguingly calls it the "intellectual laugh." It must be 
noted that the word "true" here does not pertain to any scientific truths, but simply to 
the logic through which one perceives and understands the world. When something 
does not seem to fit into that logic, we deem it nonsensical and may laugh; the 
something that happens could simply be new—as in the surprise of children seeing 
something for the first t i m e o r it could be incongruous to one's conceptual system 
(Morreall 43). This is the reason why such laughter may be called "intellectual": it 
involves the comparison between one's reason and the reality before him. While the 
laughter of the superiority theory originates from emotions, the laughter of the 
incongruity theory is an intellectual delight (Morreall 15). Furthermore, what one 
finds incongruous is dependent on one's experience, culture and historical 
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background. This explains why what one group of people find humorous may not 
carry to other groups. As Morreall expresses, "To share humor with someone we need 
to share a form of life with him" (61). 
The theory of incongruous laughter has its roots early. Aristotle teaches in the 
Rhetoric that people are often "struck by what is out of the way" (167). Hobbes also 
speculates that laughter of incongruity may be an alternative to malicious laughter: 
"Laughter without offence, must be at absurdities and infirmities abstracted from 
persons, and when all the company may laugh together" (4:46). Again, because 
derisive laughter was considered the paradigm case in the past, neither philosopher 
elaborated his thoughts along this line. This theory wasn't taken up seriously until 
Immanuel Kant. He writes, "Something absurd (something in which, therefore, the 
understanding can of itself find no delight) must be present in whatever is to raise a 
hearty convulsive laugh. Laughter is an affection arising from a strained expectation 
being suddenly reduced to nothing” (199, emphasis in original). In other words, when 
we see something absurd (in the broader sense that it is ridiculous), we laugh because 
the expectation in our minds is released into "nothing." This aspect of the release 
associates Kant with the relief theory, which we will examine later. Indeed, for Kant, 
the pleasure laughter brings has more to do with the physicality of the body and less 
to do with cognitive satisfaction, for he cannot see how something that violates reason 
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may satisfy reason. However, something that appears at first glance absurd may only 
appear so because we have never encountered it, and later may rightly be incorporated 
into our reason. In this sense, the laughter of incongruity can be one of shock, and can 
also be the pleasure in seeing a new reality. The laughter of the Theatre of the Absurd 
fits better into the latter explanation because from the very start it does not portray a 
world on which the audience may build its expectation (to be released at a latter point). 
Certainly, the enjoyment of viewing an absurd play is not just a result of "the 
influence of the representation upon the body," but also has a cognitive dimension 
(Kant 199). 
Another theorist of the theory of incongruity, Arthur Schopenhauer, gives a 
better explanation of the laughter at incongruity. He disagrees with Kant that in 
incongruous laughter the expectation amounts to nothing, but to something 
unexpected. He argues, in a manner similar to Kant, 
[I]n everything that excites laughter it must always be possible to show a 
conception and a particular, that is, a thing or event, which certainly can be 
subsumed under that conception, and therefore thought through it, yet in 
another and more predominating aspect does not belong to it at all, but is 
strikingly different from everything else that is thought through that 
conception. (2: 271) 
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When a mismatch occurs between our abstract conception of the world and the 
concrete fact before us, we laugh. For example, the audience laughs when two 
characters, Nagg and Nell, emerge from garbage cans in Beckett's play Endgame. In 
our conception, what go into garbage cans are items no longer useful or desirable. In a 
way, the two old parents may indeed be put in that category; on the other hand, the 
fact that they are humans and should never be thought in terms of rubbish produces a 
mismatch and causes laughter in the audience. The pleasure of such laughter is similar 
to that of solving the question "which one of these doesn't fit." Schopenhauer's theory, 
thus, explains the intellectual aspect of the incongruity theory in a way that Kant's 
theory does not. 
The theory of superiority and the theory of incongruity are by no means 
mutually exclusive. There have been numerous efforts at separating the two, but the 
line between them is blurred. Kant, for instance, tells the story of an Indian seeing a 
bottle of beer for the first time, marveling at its froth. When an Englishman asks him 
what astonishes him, the Indian replies that he doesn't wonder about the beer flowing 
out, but how it ever got into the bottle. Kant remarks, "At this we laugh...not because 
we think ourselves, maybe, more quick-witted than this ignorant Indian...[but because] 
our expectation was extended to the full and suddenly went off into nothing" (200). It 
is, however, not at all clear why Kant has insisted that this is a case of laughter 
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growing purely out of incongruity, and written off the possibility of it being a laugh of 
superiority. Indeed, the inclusion of the ethnicity of the butt of the joke一an Indian— 
strongly suggests that at least part of the goal of the joke is to make fun of someone 
considered inferior by the joke-teller and the listener's society. Seeing the fuzzy line 
between the two theories, some theorists try to incorporate the two. Schopenhauer 
asserts, “The laugh of scorn announces with triumph to the baffled adversary how 
incongruous were the conceptions he cherished with the reality which is now 
revealing itself to him" (2: 281). His words bear resemblance to Plato's idea that self-
ignorance is always mocked. Pushing the idea further, Schopenhauer argues that when 
we laugh at ourselves, we are discovering the incongruity between our thoughts一 
"which, in our foolish confidence in man or fate, we entertained"—and the reality (2: 
281). Such laughter, he believes, can only be bitter. Certainly, with the addition of the 
theory of incongruity, we have moved a step closer to the laughter of the absurd. 
One last theorist we will look at in connection with the theory of incongruity is 
Henri Bergson. His theory of laughter also integrates both the theory of superiority 
and the theory of incongruity. Writing a century later than Kant and Schopenhauer in 
the Industrial Age, Bergson considers the main incongruity of his time to be humans 
acting like machines. Using the example of a man falling on the street, Bergson 
argues that the situation is comic because we perceive that the man has not sat down 
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intentionally, but has fallen due to a "lack of elasticity, through absentmindedness and 
a kind of physical obstinacy" (9). That is to say, when a man sees a banana peel on the 
street, instead of displaying the pliability of a thinking being, plunges on like a robot 
and falls, we laugh. We are surprised by the incongruity between his appearance and 
his action. The comic fall can be understood literally, and also figuratively. The 
involuntary fall of the body, together with the lapse of the consciousness into 
unwitting automaticity, constitutes the comic (Weller 89). From this, Bergson draws 
his law of laughter: ''Any arrangement of acts and events is comic which gives us, in a 
single combination, the illusion of life and the distinct impression of a mechanical 
arrangement” (69, emphasis in original). However, Bergson's theory does not stop at 
the reason of laughter; instead, it goes on to explain its function. Bergson believes that 
elasticity is an essential element of human life, the lacking of which causes physical, 
mental and social ills (18). While mechanical beings bring certain benefits such as 
effectiveness into society, Bergson maintains that "society asks for something more; it 
is not satisfied with simply living, it insists on living well" (19). Unquestionably, 
laughter is an important element in this equation. Since no one likes being laughed at, 
laughter is used to indicate to someone who is being too rigid and forgetting to live 
life well. As Bergson says, "This rigidity is the comic, and laughter is its corrective，’ 
(20). In this, he is speaking in the tradition of Aristotle and the notion that the laughter 
3 1 
of superiority serves as a signal and remedy to social problems. In relation to the 
Theatre of the Absurd, we will discuss further how laughter is indispensable in living 
a good life. 
The Theory of Relief 
The theory of superiority and the theory of incongruity that we have just 
looked at both attempt to explain what triggers laughter. The theory of relief, which 
we now turn to, is quite different from the other two theories. Claiming that laughter 
is the physiological expression of psychical energy being released, the theory of relief 
is less concerned with the causes than the mechanism of laughter. Freud, 
representative theorist of the theory of relief, writes, "[A joke's] jokiness, is not 
attached to the thought" but "in the form... for its jokiness and its effect vanish when 
its wording is replaced by something different" (12). In short, he believes that 
laughter is not produced by the actual content of the joke, but how this content is put 
in joke form, which brings about the release of psychical energy. In the following, we 
shall see how this theory complements the other two theories of laughter. 
In his book The Joke and Its Relation to the Unconscious, Freud associates the 
joke with the dream, finding them both enigmatic, instinctive and involuntary (22-3). 
According to his theory, jokes, like dreams, enable one to breach the barriers 
separating one from his desires repressed in the unconscious, and the energy saved 
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from upholding these inhibitions is released in an explosion of laughter. He finds that 
jokes share certain techniques with dreams, and these techniques allow for the 
expression of repressed thoughts in jokes. An example of these techniques is 
absurdity, or, as Freud calls it, "witty nonsense" (48). As an example, he quotes from 
a German newspaper, which, to the old proverb "Never to have been born would be 
the best for mortal kind," adds, "But that scarcely happens to one in 100,000" (48). 
Here, we are reminded of the theory of incongruity, which would explain that this 
joke is funny because it conflicts with our understanding of the philosophical saying. 
However, for Freud, the contrast itself is not the cause of laughter. He argues that 
"there is sense hiding in this nonsense, and that it is this sense in the nonsense that 
makes the nonsense a joke" (48). In the previous example, the appendage appears 
nonsensical, as it takes a philosophical saying literally; however, it reveals at the same 
time that the saying itself does not make much sense either (Freud 48-9). Thus, it is 
shown that absurdity disguises "mockery and criticism" in a joke, and lets these 
normally hidden thoughts come to our awareness (104). In doing so, absurdity renders 
the energy used to repress unconscious criticism redundant, and this energy is 
released in laughter. Freud also adds that absurdity is especially effective in 
heightening our attention, creating a "physical damming-up" of energy, and holding 
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that energy at bay until the joke accomplishes its goal (149-50). All these contribute 
to the ability of the absurd to induce great laughter. 
In connection with the theory of superiority, Freud proposes that most jokes 
are tendentious, and serve ends beyond simple word play. Tendentious jokes can be 
roughly divided into the hostile variety and the obscene variety; the former aims at 
attacking others, the latter at stripping someone naked (94). Though most innate in 
humans, Freud argues, these thoughts are censored by society when not expressed in a 
joking form. The tendentious joke, however, allows not only for such forbidden 
impulses to be expressed but also to be met with approval. The pleasure of the 
tendentious joke is great, because "it will get around restrictions and open up sources 
of pleasure that have become inaccessible" (100, emphasis in original). Using bawdy 
talk as an example, Freud explains the relationship between the joker, the listener and 
the butt. Originally, a man making an obscene speech is not only trying to satisfy his 
own libido, but is trying to arouse the woman as well; yet, when the woman appears 
unwilling, the libido is met with an obstacle (96). The bawdy talk then becomes an 
end in itself, turning aggressive as the libido tries to overcome the obstacle and reach 
for the inhibited pleasure (96). In this process, the listener's presence becomes crucial 
presence, because it automatically makes the woman inaccessible, and the joker must 
recruit him as an ally in his act of sexual aggression (96-7). In addition, the joker 
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cannot laugh by himself since the work of making the joke consumes any surplus 
energy he may have (146). He may feel pleasure as the barrier is overcome by his 
joke, but he is not able to laugh. He has to tell it to the listener, who, "purchas[ing] the 
pleasure of the joke with a very small expenditure of his own," may laugh on behalf 
of the joker (145). Therefore, according to Freud's theory, laughter is best produced 
when there are three parties, for the listener can release his energy without any 
inhibitions. 
Freud's theory of the tendentious joke provides interesting insight into our 
subject of the self-reflexive laugh. Normally, the butt is being made fun of and the 
listener laughs when he endorses the attack. However, in the case of the risus purus, 
the listener recognizes that the butt is actually himself. In the act of associating the 
butt's condition with his own, the energy to be released in laughter is consumed. This 
helps explain why the risus purus is never a hearty laugh. Nevertheless, despite not 
providing the relief that typical laughter provides, the self-reflexive joke, or "humor," 
is considered by Freud as the best kind of joke. He writes, "Obviously, what is fine 
about [humor] is the triumph of narcissism, the ego's victorious assertion of its own 
invulnerability. It refuses to be hurt by the arrows of reality or to be compelled to 
suffer" (113). He continues to say, "Humor is not resigned; it is rebellious. It signifies 
the triumph not only of the ego, but also of the pleasure principle, which is strong 
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enough to assert itself here in the face of the adverse real circumstances" (113). In 
other words, humor overcomes suffering but does not resort to aggression against 
others; instead, it uses laughter to rebel against the situation. 
Conclusion 
The overview of the theories of laughter has revealed that different kinds of 
laughter in the past were related to and contributed to bringing about the laughter of 
our time, the risus purus. The superiority theory, being the oldest understanding of 
laughter, underlines the feeling of superiority inherent in the act of laughing. Laughter 
therefore indicates to its target his laughable vices, of which he is not aware. The 
function of laughter to impart knowledge is important to the risus purus, which is the 
laugh of self-recognition. Also, the superiority theory of laughter points out that no 
one is truly superior when laughing. The risus purus is achieved when, in laughing at 
someone inferior, a man realizes that he is essentially laughing at himself. The second 
theory, the theory of incongruity, explains our urge to continue to laugh in our time. 
The basic argument of the theory of incongruity is that we laugh when we perceive 
something that goes against our reason. After the two world wars, the world has 
become an unrecognizable place, and humans seem to be a wholly misfit in the world 
they live in. These absurdities astonish us, and we laugh; not only do we laugh, but 
we laugh at ourselves, because this absurd condition is shared by everyone without 
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exception. Finally, the relief theory argues that laughter is a release of pent-up 
psychical energy; in this sense, it is a defense mechanism of the ego. In particular, 
being able to laugh at oneself enables one to face and even overcome one's 
circumstances. Thus, the risus purus is especially important in our time. In the 
following chapter, we shall witness in Beckett's works the continuous effort to laugh 
in a world that has turned absurd. 
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Chapter 2: Laughter and Man's Obligation to Persist in Beckett's Endgame 
Introduction 
The previous chapter highlights the paradox of laughter in our days, which, after 
the two world wars, seem more destitute and dismal than ever. Can, and indeed 
should, laughter thrive in such an environment? Yes, Samuel Beckett seems to 
suggest, laughter is possible in our times, if only of the mirthless kind. As one of the 
most influential writers of the Century, Beckett's works portray a bleak and 
deteriorated picture of the human condition. On the other hand, the comic quality of 
his writing is evident and widely recognized. In 1969, Beckett was awarded the Nobel 
Prize in Literature; the introduction given for him speaks of his works as "containing 
a love of mankind that grows in understanding as it plumbs farther into the depths of 
abhorrence, a courage of despair, a compassion that has to reach the utmost of 
suffering to discover that there are no bounds of charity" (qtd. in Athanason 79). To 
find love for men despite their abhorrence, courage that grows in the face of despair, 
and compassion that increases amidst suffering, Beckett chooses to work with the 
form of tragicomedy. The laughter produced by these texts is no less paradoxical; it is 
the mirthless laugh, "the laugh that laughs...at that which is unhappy" (Beckett, Watt 
48). As I shall demonstrate, this paradoxical laugh grows, like the love of mankind, 
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out of understanding, and is instrumental to bringing about the courage much needed 
in our age. 
Endgame�Significance 
An extremely prolific writer, Beckett has written in many forms and for a variety 
of media; he has written novels, short stories, plays, as well as for the radio, television, 
and the screen. For reasons stipulated in the introduction, laughter is most easily 
observable and therefore best studied in connection with drama. In this particular 
research, the study of the risus purus and the way it plays out in Beckettian fashion 
shall be done on the basis of Beckett's second published play, Endgame. This play is 
chosen for many different reasons. For one, it is one of Beckett's favorite plays (Pattie 
36, Athanason 9). When Beckett sent a copy of Endgame to Roger Blin, the French 
director to whom the play was dedicated, he attached a note to it that read, "For you, 
if you really want it, but only if you really want it. Because it really has meaning, the 
others are only everyday," thus assigning Endgame special significance (qtd. in 
Athanason 9). More importantly, as it shall become clear, Endgame is in a strategic 
position for the study of the risus purus. As Beckett's texts display a remarkably 
consistent development in the writer's views and concerns, it is important to look 
backward and even forward in order to read one work in perspective. Hence, a study 
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of the development of Beckett's prose and plays will reveal that Endgame is in a 
special position to produce the last laugh. 
The Risus Purus and the Transition from Modernism to Postmodernism 
Returning again to Beckett's quote, it can be clearly seen that the bitter laugh, the 
hollow laugh, and the mirthless laugh, in that order, are different stages of the 
development of laughter. Beckett calls this process "successive excoriations of the 
understanding" {Watt 48). In other words, to proceed from one laugh to another, one 
must gain a deeper understanding of things. When a man first laughs at that which is 
"not good," he is laughing out of a sense of superiority. This is a laugh that is 
managed by most people, even children, and the object of laughter is perceived to be 
completely different from the self. In the second stage, when a man laughs at that 
which is "not true," he is laughing at things that are out of place, that run counter to 
his reason. Children may also laugh at what they see to be strange, but as they grow 
and their understanding of the world expands, such laughter decreases. Both of these 
laughs are directed at an object outside, isolated from the self. Finally, when one 
realizes that he is not different from the object of his laughter, that he has been 
laughing erroneously all along, he again laughs, this time at himself who has made the 
unhappy discovery. The mirthless laugh, therefore, is no longer directed outwards but 
turned inwards. Beckett also describes the development of laughter as a "passage 
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from the less to the greater, from the lower to the higher, from the outer to the inner, 
from the gross to the fine, from the matter to the form" {Watt 48). That is to say, the 
mirthless laugh is the highest laugh, the risus purus, pure because it is "the laugh of 
spirit in its absolute separation from matter" (Weller 123). To reach the risus purus, 
laughter must be distilled through the other two laughs. As one reflects about his 
laughter, he gains a deeper understanding of his self. 
On the other hand, it must also be noted that the mirthless laugh is also the last 
laugh. The eventual disappearance of laughter can be associated with the transition of 
modernism to postmodernism. The modem mood permeates Camus's speculation of 
the absurd condition of man, who finds himself irreversibly alienated from his 
surroundings; the laugh aiming at the absurd is the modern laugh. However, simply 
laughing at unhappiness, even if it belongs to oneself, may not be the purely self-
reflexive, self-knowing laugh that is the risus purus. When speaking of laughing at 
oneself, theorists often argue that it is possible only through a split of the self. 
Bergson says that in order to laugh, we must become dissociated from the object of 
our laughter, suspending our pity and affection, even if it is ourselves. Freud also 
maintains that, when one employs humour, he is in effect "comparing his present self 
with himself as a child" (227). These views of the self-reflexive laugh place it closer 
to the bitter laugh of superiority, through which the laughing self feels that it has 
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overcome its past, inferior self; it lacks the mirthless quality of the risus purus. The 
true pure laugh, therefore, cannot be attained unless the boundary between the subject 
and object of laughter is taken down. As a matter of fact, since the development of 
laughter involves a deepening of understanding of oneself as well as others, it is 
inevitable that the laughing self would come to recognize he is not in any position to 
determine who is laughing and who is being laughed at (Weller 133). As this thought 
sets in, his laugh becomes the risus purus. This laugh, besides being the last laugh, is 
thus also the "dianoetic" laugh一through discursive reasoning, there become fewer 
and fewer things that one can laugh at, until finally his laugh becomes ‘‘a pure laugh 
of pure mind," and stops because no object of laughter exists any longer (Weller 125). 
In this course of development of laughter, as Beckett has laid out, it is not difficult to 
see the postmodern impulse, which strives to discredit the certainty invested in "the 
fine line between laughter and tears," in the binary opposition between the laughing 
and the laughed at (Topsfield 2). In doing so, Wolfgang Iser suggests, Beckett's 
works force us to give up the frameworks we adopt to interpret people around us and 
so secure an advantageous position for ourselves (67). Iser points out that the paradox 
of the "modem consciousness" is that it desires freedom, but at the same time holds 
onto “constraints, repressions and prefabricated solutions"; this paradox is the source 
of our unhappiness (68). Only when we are able to laugh away our own 
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preconceptions brought about "not by reality, but by man's need to explain reality," 
can we become liberated from "the displacement caused by social and cultural 
repression" (Iser 67, 68). Thus, the risus purus, by eliminating the difference between 
the subject and the object, dispels the very unhappiness that it laughs at. 
The Development of the Risus Purus in Beckett's Prose 
In order to achieve the risus purus, both the matter and the form of Beckett's 
texts must change accordingly. Beckett has often been considered one of the last 
modernists, or one of the first postmodernists. Certainly, his works reflect a gradual 
transition. Published in 1934, Beckett's first published work, More Pricks than Kicks, 
is a collection of short stories featuring the protagonist Belacqua, "a poet by 
profession, a drunkard by heredity and by environment a philanderer" (Calder-
Marshall 14). Such a character easily inspires laughter, and much of the comedy of 
the book is derived from the ridiculous way Belacqua conducts himself, both in 
private and in front of others. For example, in the first story "Dante and the Lobster," 
Belacqua's peculiar eating habits are described. He eats only toast that is burnt 
"through and through" and cheese that is rotten (11). His shopping for cheese is 
especially funny: 
He looked skeptically at the cut of cheese. He turned it over on its back to 
see was the other side any better. The other side was worse...He rubbed it. 
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It was sweating. That was something. He stooped and smelt it. A faint 
fragrance of corruption. What good was that? He didn't want fragrance, he 
wasn't a bloody gourmet, he wanted a good stench. What he wanted was a 
good, green stanching rotten lump of Gorgonzola cheese, alive, and by God 
he would have it. (13-14) 
Later, Belacqua finds the cheese to be the best he has had, and again his surprise is 
described in a comic manner: 
And such a pale soapy piece of cheese to prove so strong! He must only 
conclude that he had been abusing himself all these years in relating the 
strength of cheese directly to its greenness. We live and learn, that was a 
true say. Also his teeth and jaws had been in heaven, splinters of 
vanquished toast spraying forth at each gnash. It was like eating glass. (17) 
While an extremely funny character, Beckett soon discarded Belacqua, stating, "He 
was an impossible person in the end. I gave him up in the end because he was not 
serious" (qtd. in Topsfield 39). Obviously, the problem with a character like Belacqua 
is that he is "impossible" in real life, and the reader cannot take him seriously一 
cannot identify with him. One laughs at Belacqua, s outlandish way of conducting 
himself entirely out of superiority. It is no wonder that a reviewer found the humour 
of the book to be lighthearted (Calder-Marshall 14). However, as early as in More 
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Pricks than Kicks, the suspicion towards such lighthearted, clear-cut laughter already 
exists. Lying on what he believes to be his deathbed, Belacqua speculates: 
It is true that he did not care for these black and white alternatives as a rule. 
Indeed he even went so far as to hazard a little paradox on his own account, 
to the effect that between contraries no alternation was possible. But was it 
the moment for a man to be nice? Belacqua snatched eagerly at the issue. 
Was it to be laughter or tears? It came to the same thing in the end, but 
which was it to be now? (175) 
In Beckett's subsequent works, this question becomes increasingly difficult to 
answer, as laughter becomes associated with darker, gloomier matters. Murphy, 
Beckett's next published work, displays this change. The protagonist, Murphy, is 
trapped since the very first sentence of the novel: "The sun shone, having no 
alternative, on the nothing new" (1). The accommodation of Murphy is a "mew," a 
"cage," and later when he moves to work in a mental asylum he lives in a garret, and 
his job is to put people into their cells, or the "box" (1, 162, 248). What is worse is 
that Murphy constantly feels trapped within his own body. Preferring to live only in 
his mind, he opts to stay in his rocking chair, because "it was not until his body was 
appeased that he could come alive in his mind" (2). Murphy's confinement to his 
rocking chair hints at the various degrees of physical disability Beckett's later 
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characters will suffer. His body, moreover, desires more than just a chair; it desires a 
woman named Celia, and Murphy agonizes over his lust for her: "The part of him that 
he hated craved for Celia, the part that he loved shriveled up at the thought of her" (8). 
Celia, in turn, reminds Murphy that both their bodies require food, and pressures him 
into finding a job. As he begins working at a mental sanatorium, he becomes 
fascinated by insanity and its possibility of releasing him from the "colossal fiasco" 
that is life (178). As shown, Murphy concentrates on the absurdity of man's existence 
as he is at the beck and call of his own flesh, and much of its humour is built upon this. 
The best example is found in Murphy's will, which dictates that his body should be 
flushed down the toilet: "With regard to the disposal of these my body, mind and soul, 
I desire that they be burnt and placed in a paper bag and …[that] goes down into the 
pit, and I desire that the chain be there pulled upon them... the whole to be executed 
without ceremony or show of grief ' (269). Murphy's final message is a practical joke 
his mind makes on his body, in revenge for holding it prisoner for so long. Thus, the 
split between the mind and body, and the sense of being trapped, produce laughter 
that is turned inward. 
This course of development is even clearer in the trilogy: Molloy, Malone Dies 
and The Unnamable. Following the trend set in the earlier works, there is a continual 
narrowing of space in the trilogy; the protagonist is often crippled and confined, and 
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the theme of death is prevalent. Furthermore, there are fewer things and movement in 
the narrative. Under these circumstances, laughter becomes increasingly internalized 
as well as mirthless. In Molloy, the first part is narrated by an old man Molloy, who 
lives in his mother's room without knowing how lie got there; the second part consists 
of the inner monologue of a detective named Moran, and he is sent to track down 
Molloy, who has committed murder. As the story progresses, one senses that Molloy 
and Moran are actually the same person, and that Molloy is an identity invented by 
Moran, who has slipped into insanity. Chronologically, the second part comes before 
the first part. Therefore, even though Molloy declares, "What I'd like now is to speak 
of the things that are left, say my good-byes, finish dying," the narrative is not 
heading towards its end but its beginning (7). The cyclical structure of the novel 
reflects the cyclical nature of life, as Molloy says: "My life, my life, now I speak of it 
as of something over, now as of a joke which still goes on, and it is neither, for at the 
same time it is over and it goes on, and is there any tense for that?" (36) And because 
the line between death and life is blurred, the reaction towards death becomes 
uncertain. Molloy expresses his confusion about a woman whose dog has died, saying, 
"I thought she was going to cry, it was the thing to do, but on the contrary she laughed. 
It was perhaps her way of crying. Or perhaps I was mistaken and she was really 
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crying, with the noise of laughter" (37). Thus, as laughing and crying become 
indistinguishable, the laughter of Molloy moves towards being mirthless. 
The next part of the trilogy, Malone Dies, marks a further step in the direction 
of the risus purus. Like Moran before him, Malone tells stories by creating different 
names for his past selves. However, this time, his alter egos are not products of 
madness but intention. For Malone, the self is associated with darkness: "I feel the old 
dark gathering, the solitude preparing, by which I know myself, (189). He first felt 
this darkness as a child, when all his playmates left him. As Thomas Cousineau 
explains: "[T]he T of personal subjectivity began as an ' i t '—an object in the eyes of 
its community—and that it owes its origin to its traumatic expulsion from this 
community" (91). The formation of self, in opposition to others, is therefore closely 
related with the feeling of being excommunicated一in other words, with the absurd. 
The resulting darkness is threatening; "it accumulates, thickens, then suddenly bursts 
and drowns everything" {Malone Dies 190). In order to disperse this darkness, one 
must engage in play: that is, to return to the state before the separation between the 
subject and the object. Malone does this by intentionally eliminating his self from the 
narrative: "I shall be neutral and inert...I shall pay less heed to myself (180). Instead, 
he talks about himself in the third person, through the characters Sapo and Macmann. 
Sometimes, such play appears to be impossible, as Malone complains: "What tedium. 
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And I call that playing. I wonder if I am not talking yet again about myself. Shall I be 
incapable, to the end, of lying on any other subject?" (189). Nevertheless, Malone 
persists in his task, with a note of caution to himself: “I must simply be on my guard, 
reflecting on what I have said before I go on and stopping, each time disaster 
threatens, to look at myself as I am. That is just what I wanted to avoid. But there 
seems to be no other solution" (189). Paradoxically, as Malone views himself as "an 
object in the eyes of others," breaking down the boundary between subject and object, 
he gains a better understanding of himself as a subject (Cousineau 91). This increase 
of self-knowledge no doubt produces a laugh that is unhappy, but at the same time it 
keeps the darkness, the "disaster [that] threatens," at bay. Therefore, the laughing of 
the risus purus is a choice made to fight off the overwhelming absurdity of the human 
condition. 
So far, we have witnessed a progressive doing away of traditional narrative 
devices in Beckett's prose, including the plot, setting, and characters. This process 
culminates in The Unnamable, in which only the n a r r a t o r a nameless, disembodied 
voice一is left. He asserts that the other characters before him are only created so that 
his suffering may be distanced from himself. However, he concludes that the effort is 
a waste of time: 
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All these Murphys, Molloys and Malones do not fool me...I thought I was 
right in enlisting these sufferers of my pains. I was wrong. They never 
suffered my pains, their pains are nothing, compared to mine, a mere tittle 
of mine, the tittle I thought I could put from me, in order to witness it. Let 
them be gone now, them and all the others, those I have used and those I 
have not used, give me back the pains I lent them and vanish, from my life, 
my memory, my terrors and shames. (305-306) 
These characters (the voice calls them "puppets") offer him no comfort because their 
unhappiness is part of his own, and ultimately he needs to "scatter them, to the winds" 
(294). The voice also admits that, like his characters, the difference between subject 
and object is imaginary; he says, “[I]t,s the fault of the pronouns, there is no name for 
me, no pronoun for me, all the trouble comes from that...let us leave all that, forget 
about all that, it's not difficult, our concern is with someone, or our concern is with 
something, now we're getting it, someone or something that is not there, or that is not 
anywhere" (408). As the boundary between subject and object is taken down, humour 
is discarded, like all other things; the earlier laughter caused by cheese and toast and 
bicycles is no longer possible (Weller 112). In fact, laughter can hardly be 
distinguished as such: "heart-rending cries, inarticulate murmurs, to be invented, as I 
go along, improvised, as I groan along, I'll laugh, that's how it will end, in a chuckle, 
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chuck chuck, ow, ha, pa, I'll practice...it's tiring, hee hee" (412). Only a difficult and 
unhappy sound is left, mixed with groans and whimpers. In this "posthumous" as well 
as "posthumourous" setting, even the risus purus ends (Weller 133). 
The Development of the Risus Purus in Beckett's Plays 
The course of development of the risus purus in Beckett's early prose is 
repeated in his plays. After The Unnamable, Beckett stopped producing significant 
texts for a period of time; he seemed to have encountered "the silence, a few gurgles 
on the silence, the real silence" that the voice of The Unnamable spoke of, which 
came after the risus purus (412). However, as the voice declares in the end of The 
Unnamable, "I can't go on, I'll go on," the silence must be broken (418). In order to 
do so, Beckett turned to the theatre, stating, "you have a definite space and people in 
this space, that's relaxing" (qtd. in Topsfield 23). Waiting for Godot, written in 1949 
between Malone Dies and The Unnamable, includes several characters, who are again 
given the luxury of open space and a handful of things: hats, shoes, radishes and a 
carrot, and so on. This seems to revive some of the light-hearted humour reminiscent 
of Beckett's earlier works. For example, Estragon and Vladimir, the two main 
characters, engage in a comic routine of hat-swapping, exchanging three hats between 
themselves (63-64). At the end of the play, Estragon drops his trousers (87). Their 
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actions make them appear a pair of clowns, which they acknowledge inadvertently in 
the following exchange: 
Vladimir: Charming evening we're having. 
Estragon: Unforgettable. 
Vladimir: And it's not over. 
Estragon: Apparently not. 
Vladimir: It's only beginning. 
Estragon: It's awful. 
Vladimir: Worse than the pantomime. 
Estragon: The circus. 
Vladimir: The music-hall. 
Estragon: The circus. 
Pozzo: What can I have done with that briar? 
Estragon: He's a scream. He's lost his dudeen. 
[Laughs noisily.] (27-28) 
Unbeknownst to Estragon and Vladimir, when laughing at Pozzo, they are in fact 
ridiculing their own performance. As the audience, in turn, laughs at their ignorance, 
they become aware of the possibility that their laughter may rebound on themselves as 
well. Iser Wolfgang explains: 
Our laughter is evidence of our position of superiority, but this position 
depends upon conditions that we have produced for ourselves... 
Consequently our reaction is, in the last analysis, not to the clowning of the 
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play, but to our own interpretation of it as clowning, which manifests itself 
in the flaring up and the dying down of our laughter. (57-58) 
It is just as Vladimir says (after "break[ing] into a hearty laugh which he immediately 
stifles"): "One daren't even laugh any more" (3). In Waiting for Godot, one already 
finds the beginning of the risus purus. 
In the plays following Waiting for Godot, the mood again turns sober. In 
Endgame and Krapp 's Last Tape, the audience is taken back to closed, dark rooms, 
where laughter, like the number of props, dwindles. The room in Endgame resembles 
the inside of a human skull, with the grey lighting being the grey matter and the two 
windows being the eyes (Athanason 14). The characters inhabiting the room, then, 
signify different aspects of the same person, and when they laugh at one another they 
are actually laughing at themselves, whose suffering is the same. In Krapp，s Last 
Tape, laughter becomes even more obviously self-reflexive. Sixty-nine-year-old 
Krapp, listening to his thirty-nine-year-old self on tape, laughs in derision at him, but 
also with him at the young Krapp in his twenties (13). There is no doubt that, if Krapp 
lives to eighty years old, he would still laugh at his present self. Thus, the string of 
laughter directed at previous Krapps highlights the fact that the positions of the 
laughing being and the target of his laughter can easily be switched. Furthermore, 
besides the characters in the plays, Beckett unsettles the audience's privileged 
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position to laugh as they view the plays. When Patrick Magee, the actor playing 
Hamm in the London production of Endgame, asked Beckett what Hamm was like, 
Beckett first replied, "Oh, he's a monster, not a human being. Only the monster 
remains"; however, he immediately retracted the comment and said, “No, no, he looks 
like you, Pat. Just like you" (qtd. in Athanason 58-59). In Krapp 's Last Tape, also, the 
clownish appearance of Krapp (including a purple nose) was toned down and 
eventually abandoned by Beckett (Knowlson 148). Clearly, what Beckett emphasizes 
is that the characters on stage are no different than the audience below. In a comment 
regarding Waiting for Godot that applies to all Beckett's characters, Ramona Cormier 
and Janis L. Pallister argue, "[C]ollectively these characters represent universal man. 
We do not identify with any one of the characters as we would do with a tragic hero, 
but rather with the general human situation as well as with the particular situation in 
which each character finds himself, (99). Therefore, when the audience laughs at 
these characters, they are in reality reacting to a condition they share. On the 
condition that they recognize this fact, they may produce the risus purus. 
At the end of Krapp ’s Last Tape, Krapp says, "Perhaps my best years are gone. 
When there was a chance of happiness. But I wouldn't want them back. Not with the 
fire in me now. No, I wouldn't want them back" (20). Is he being serious or ironic? 
What is the fire that is left in him? It perhaps refers to the courage one finds through 
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the risus purus, which will be discussed later. What is certain is that a conclusion has 
been reached in this play, and there is no turning back. Just as Beckett's prose reached 
the text The Unnamable, his plays eventually came to Not /，in which only a 
disembodied mouth is left, babbling amidst silence. For the purpose of this study, we 
must consider an earlier period, when there is yet laughter. When directing the 
German production of Endgame, Beckett said, "I would like as much laughter as 
possible in this play. It is a playful piece" (qtd. in Athanason 26). Teetering on the 
edge, it's not too late in Endgame; the sound of laughter has not yet died. It is 
therefore the play most suitable for the study of the risus purus. 
The Sound of Laughter in Endgame 
As its title suggests. Endgame is a play about the end. Beckett once commented 
that Hamm and Clov, the two protagonists, are actually "Vladimir and Estragon at the 
end of their lives" (qtd. in Athanason 58). In Endgame, their wait is finally over, 
which Clov expresses in his first words: "Finished, it's finished, nearly finished, it 
must nearly be finished" (12). Indeed, compared to Waiting for Godot, the situation in 
Endgame has taken a turn for the worse. While Estragon and Vladimir complain of 
various pains, the characters in Endgame are further disabled: Hamm is blind, cannot 
walk, and shows signs of internal bleeding; Clov, his servant, cannot sit, and can only 
walk in a "stiff, staggering" way; Nagg and Nell, Hamm's parents, are legless and sit 
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in ashbins with their failing sight and hearing (11). Additionally, in Waiting for Godot, 
the sun does set and the moon does rise, but in Endgame, waves have disappeared, 
rain has stopped falling, the light is perpetually grey: time has stopped completely. By 
all signs, the story of Endgame takes place after some kind of apocalyptic disaster, 
and the four wretched beings in the room are all that's left of humanity. In time, even 
their sustenance runs low—there are no more bicycle wheels, no more pap, no more 
rugs, no more sugar plums, no more painkillers. 
In this grim condition, the characters respond to their misery with laughter, 
albeit an unnatural kind. Their laughter starts and stops abruptly, as if they were not 
certain if they should or wanted to laugh at all. An example would be Clov's "brief 
laugh" in the beginning of the play, which punctuates each of his actions as he 
prepares for the day, looking out the windows, checking the ashbins, and removing 
the sheet that covers Hamm (11-12). However, it is soon revealed that outside the 
windows "it's death," the ashbins contain the perishing Nagg and Nell, and Hamm, 
with a bloodstained handkerchief on his face, resembles a corpse (15). A reaction to 
these signs of death, Clov's laugh is one of "resigned, reserved bitterness whenever it 
recurs" (Beckett, qtd. in Athanason 30). Another example is Nagg, who tries to cheer 
Nell up by telling a joke about a tailor who believes his trousers are better made than 
the world. Nell denies that the joke was ever funny, and says that she laughed the first 
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time because she "felt happy" (21). Nagg tells the joke anyway, but says despairingly 
in the middle, "I never told it worse. {Pause. Gloomy.) I tell this story worse and 
worse" (21). In the end, Nell does not laugh, because she is now as far away from 
happiness as possible; Nagg, on the other hand, "breaks into a high forced laugh, cuts 
it short, pokes his head towards Nell, launches his laugh again" (22). As Nagg's short 
bursts of false laughter show, in the face of unhappiness, laughing becomes a 
strenuous task. 
An explanation is given for their forced laugh in Nell's words: "Nothing is 
funnier than unhappiness, I grant you that...Yes, yes, it's the most comical thing in 
the world. And we laugh, we laugh, with a will, in the beginning. But it's always the 
same thing. Yes, it's like the funny story we have heard too often, we still find it 
funny, but we don't laugh any more" (20). By all signs, Endgame records a day that is 
the same as countless days before it, as Nell and Clov complain, "Why this farce, day 
after day?" (18, 26) Like Nagg's old joke, the farce that is the characters' everyday 
life becomes less and less capable of producing laughter. For one, while one may 
laugh at someone else's unhappiness in the beginning, in time one finds that one 
shares in the same unhappiness. This happens when Hamm and Clov discuss their 
physical disabilities: 
Clov: I can't sit. 
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Hamm: True. And I can't stand. 
Clov: So it is. 
Hamm: Every man his speciality. {Pause.) No phone 
calls? {Pause.) Don't we laugh? 
Clov: {After reflection). I don't feel like it. 
Hamm: {After reflection). Nor 1. (18) 
Hamm's two pauses show that he is expectant of Clov's laughter, if not at their own 
disabilities, then at the fact that everyone else has died and no one would call them; 
his final question "Don't we laugh?" indicates that they did laugh at these issues in 
the past. But if everyone outside the shelter has died, they too shall die eventually, so 
Clov, after some consideration, decides not to laugh. Furthermore, unhappiness may 
originally be funny because it goes against our reason and understanding; that such 
atrocities could happen shocks us into laughter. However, as Shane Weller elaborates, 
"As soon as we expect the absurd, as soon as we anticipate it, as soon as we are 
familiar with its rules, principles, or logic, it is no longer absurd" (125). Because 
unhappiness repeats itself daily in their world, Hamm and Clov are no longer able to 
identify it as something strange and thus risible: 
Hamm: Crawling on his belly, whining for bread for 
his brat. He's offered a job as gardener. 
Before一{Clov hursts out laughing) What is 
there so funny about that? 
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Clov: A job as a gardener! 
Hamm: Is that what tickles you? 
Clov: It must be that. 
Hamm: It wouldn't be the bread? 
Clov: Or the brat. 
Pause. 
Hamm: The whole thing is comical, I grant you that. 
What about having a good guffaw the two of 
us together? 
Clov: {after reflection). I couldn't guffaw again 
today. 
Hamm: {after reflection). Nor I. (40-41) 
Neither Hamm nor Clov could pinpoint the source of their amusement. They find the 
facts that there were once gardeners, bread and children absurd and funny, but 
completely overlook to mention the man crawling and begging for food. Their 
acceptance of misery as a commonplace occurrence points to their own depraved 
station. Since the unhappiness they witness in others continuously mirrors their own, 
over time, "after reflection," neither finds the will to laugh anymore. The dianoetic 
quality of the risus purus makes it a brief, hesitant sound, until it reaches its end. 
Repetition and the Reluctance to End in Endgame 
Despite the fact that their laughter gradually disappears in the repetition of 
their unhappy days, Hamm and Clov have no intention of ending their miserable 
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existence. Certainly, both acknowledge that dying is a less painful option than living. 
Hamm asks CIov to "finish" him twice, and Clov also says, "If I could kill him I'd die 
happy" (15, 24, 29). Nonetheless, neither is willing or able to end their misery. On the 
contrary, they are set on keeping the cycle going. Beckett has mentioned, "There are 
no accidents in Fin de par tie. Everything is based on analogy and repetition" (qtd. in 
Athanason 19). As the title Endgame suggests, the play draws an analogy with the last 
stage of a chess game. However, Beckett specifies that Hamm is ‘‘a bad player" in this 
game: "A good one would have given up long ago. He is only trying to delay the 
inevitable end. Each of his gestures is one of the last useless moves which put off the 
end" (qtd. in Topsfield 109). Hamm's stubbornness to continue is evident in his words: 
"The end is in the beginning and yet you go on" (44). That is why, even though he 
agrees with Clov's prophetic first words, that "it must be nearly finished," he insists, 
"And yet I hesitate, I hesitate to...to end. Yes, there it is, it's time it ended and yet I 
hesitate to...to end" (12). Unable to admit defeat, Hamm uses the few pieces and 
moves left at his disposal over and over again. One of his last possible moves is the 
"dialogue," which is the only thing keeping Clov from leaving (39). Throughout the 
play, the dialogue is recognizably repetitive. For example, Hamm says "we're getting 
on" for a total of four times; while in fact no real progress is made, his words are the 
very thing that keeps the play "getting on" (15,18, 30,44). It is a game that Clov 
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quickly learns to play, as he threatens to leave Hamm for no less than ten times, but 
when Hamm asks him when he is leaving, he answers, "Oh, not just yet, not just yet" 
(15). Besides the dialogue, their reluctance to end is reflected in the structure of the 
play. Though Endgame starts with the notion that the end is nigh, it never reaches a 
full completion. In the final moments of the play, Clov "halts by the door and stands 
there, impassive and motionless, his eyes fixed on Hamm, till the end" (51-52). He 
never manages to leave Hamm as he has sworn to do. Hamm, as well, responds to 
Clov's apparent departure as if it were just another game they've frequently practiced; 
he calmly says, "Since that's the way we're playing it... (he unfolds handkerchief)… 
let's play it that way," and places the handkerchief over his face, essentially returning 
to his pose in the beginning (52-53). The cyclical nature of the play draws attention to 
the fact that the performance the audience has just witnessed on stage is "merely one 
repetition in a potentially infinite series of productions which begin at the end, and 
end at the beginning, and yet go on"; the play will start again the next day, in exactly 
the same way, to another group of spectators (Hale 79, 82). Therefore, whether the 
end has come is ultimately indeterminable in Endgame, as John Oit states: "The 
'endgame' is a known routine. It is a move towards closure, but not closure itself. 
Hamm is playing at apocalypse and if the end does not come we sense that he can 
play the routine all over again" (63). 
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The Artist's Obligation in Endgame 
As shown, all aspects of Endgame point to a very basic human instinct一the 
instinct to defer the end. Beckett ties the will to survive closely with the creative 
impulse. He believes that the contemporary artist has "nothing to express, nothing 
with which to express, nothing from which to express, no power to express, no desire 
to express, together with the obligation to express" (Esslin, "Who's Afraid" 404). In 
another interview, he again stresses that the artist is a person "who, helpless, unable to 
act, acts, in the event paints, since he is obliged to paint" (qtd. in Nykrog 120). The 
use of the words "obligation" and "obliged" shows that, not only should an artist 
persist in his craft, it is something he cannot help doing. It is no wonder that Beckett's 
heroes are often artists; in the dreary world he portrays, theirs is the last remaining 
voice. In Endgame, Hamm follows the footsteps of Malone before him, telling stories 
as he awaits the end. Story-telling, for Hamm, is an effort against the unhappy 
circumstances in which he finds himself. In a conversation, Clov asks Hamm about 
his "chronicle": 
Clov: You've got on with it, I hope. 
Hamm: {modestly) Oh not very far, not very far. (He 
sighs.) There are days like that, one isn't 
inspired... I've got on with it a little all the 
same... 
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Clov: (admiringly): Well I never! In spite of 
everything you were able to get on with it! 
Hamm: {modestly) Oh not very far, you know, not 
very far, but nevertheless, better than nothing. 
Clov: Better than nothing! Is it possible? (40) 
As Hamm acknowledges, it is difficult to make up stories in a world where not much 
is left to tell, but the alternative is worse. The threat of nothingness constantly looms 
in Endgame in the form of the end, which can only be fended off with the sound of his 
own voice. In order to do so, his stories must be repeated and dragged on 
everlastingly. Hamm is clearly averse to finish his stories; at the end of one of them, 
he says, "I'll soon have finished with this story," but quickly adds, "Unless I bring in 
other characters" (37). Later, he admits that even if he ends this story, he will always 
tell a new one: "Perhaps I could go on with my story, end it and begin another" (44-
45). Hamm even equates the ending of story-telling to death: 
Clov: Pah! You'll make up another. 
Hamm: 1 don't know. {Pause.) I feel rather drained. 
{Pause.) The prolonged creative effort. 
{Pause.) If I could drag myself down to the 
sea! I'd make a pillow of sand for my head and 
the tide would come. 
Clov: There's no more tide. (41) 
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As Clov points out rather dryly, it is impossible for Hamm to commit suicide in the 
way he envisions, as they both know very well. Like his stubborn hold on life, the 
creative instinct is intrinsic to Hamm; he can no more deny it than he can deny his 
will to survive. Just as Beckett describes: he is helpless to do it, but he is obliged to do 
it. 
Self-Reflexivity in Endgame and the Risus Purus 
Being an artist, Hamm's task is essentially the same as that of Beckett's. Just as 
Beckett asserts that his mission "in these times [when] confusion invades our 
experience at every moment...[is] to find a new form that accommodates the mess," 
Hamm continues to tell stories amidst a destitute wasteland (qtd. in Topsfield 128). 
Owing to the similarity between the character Hamm and his creator, throughout the 
play Hamm displays an extraordinary self-awareness. Shimon Levy identifies Hamm 
as "a self-conscious, self-referring actor... who act out[s] the self-referential meaning" 
(124). For example, Hamm begins his part with the words, "Me...to play" (12). 
Aware that he is an actor in a play, Hamm makes frequent remarks about what he is 
doing, such as: ‘‘An aside, ape! Did you never hear an aside before?" and "I'm 
warming up for my last soliloquy" (49). Sometimes, he even complains directly to the 
playwright; when Beckett brings in a new character, a little boy, Hamm cries, "More 
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complications!... Not an underplot, I trust" (49). Furthermore, Hamm's declaration to 
"play" highlights his role as a playwright, holding creative license over the stories he 
tells and the characters he invents. The following excerpt is an example of the stories 
that he tells: 
It was a glorious bright day, I remember, fifty by the heliometer, but already 
the sun was sinking down into the... down among the dead. (Normal voice.) 
Nicely put, that. (Narrative tone.) Come on now, come on, present your 
petition and let me resume my labors. (Pause. Normal tone.) There's 
English for you. Ah well... (Narrative tone.) ...It was a howling wild day, I 
remember, a hundred by the anenometer. The wind was tearing up the dead 
pines and sweeping them... away. (Pause. Normal tone.) A bit feeble, that. 
(36) 
As shown, Hamm not only comments on his own actions within the bigger play, but 
also analyses his own story as he is telling it. His story is a play within a play, and the 
commentary Hamm makes about himself is in effect the comments Beckett makes 
concerning his own work. 
Being a cycle of constant self-referral, Endgame encourages the risus purus, 
which is a self-referential laugh. Beckett makes the point that no one is in the position 
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to ridicule anyone else, not even the artist. Hamm, a character that always demands to 
be "right in the center," seeks to confirm his authority (24). In his stories, he tries to 
maintain control over a realm where any resemblance of order has disappeared; 
unsurprisingly, the story he tells is about a downtrodden man begging him for food 
and shelter for his child. Beckett, also, expresses that for him the appeal of writing a 
play is to "make a world of one's own in order to satisfy one's need to know, to 
understand, one's need for order...One turns out a small world with its own laws, 
conducts the actions as if upon a chess board" (qtd. in Athanason 24). However, as 
Hamm finds out, the order storytelling offers is temporary, because language itself is 
unstable and inadequate for his purpose. For instance, recalling the people who have 
come to him before, Hamm says, "All those I might have helped. (Pause.) Helped! 
(Pause.) Saved. (Pause.) Saved!" (44) Unsure with the first word "helped," Hamm 
immediately revises it but remains dissatisfied, and again exclaims "saved!" in 
derision. His pauses and repetition make it doubtful that he could have, or would have, 
been of any help to anybody. This reversal of words is known as correctio, a 
rhetorical device that relentlessly obliterates what has just been said and threatens to 
unravel the narrative at any moment (Weller 120). It is also a rhetorical device used 
extensively by Beckett. In Malone Dies, Malone notes this characteristic of his stories: 
"But my notes have a curious tendency, as I realize at last, to annihilate all they 
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purport to record" (107). In Endgame, too, the characters often speak in contradiction. 
In particular, Nell is known for answering "no" to any question, then adding a follow-
up question that renders the negative answer earlier meaningless (19-20). Thus, as 
Hamm stumbles in his effort of establishing order in his stories, Beckett is at the same 
time scorning his own creative efforts. However, while the audience laughs at the 
absurd antics of the characters on stage, they must acknowledge that their trying to 
make sense of their actions is no less laughable. Shimon Levy argues the following: 
The dialogue on stage...reflects a desired dialogue between playwright and 
audience, and hence expresses a concern for humanity. Because the 
playwright has already done his share by the very act of writing and 
presenting the play, it is now up to the audience and the individual people 
that constitute it to do their share. (4) 
Since Beckett has taken the lead in laughing at himself, the audience is invited to 
laugh at itself too, as Hamm mocks: "Imagine if a rational being came back to earth, 
wouldn't he be liable to get ideas into his head if he observed us long enough. {Voice 
of rational being.) Ah, good, now I see what it is, yes, now I understand what they're 
at!" (27). Leaving no one sure of their superiority and position to laugh, Endgame 
produces the last laugh. 
The Risus Purus as a Choice to Continue 
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It has been established that as we gain a more accurate understanding of 
ourselves—that we are not different from those that we laugh a t t h e risus purus 
occurs. Being the last laugh, it eliminates the border between subject and object, 
between laughter and tears. As demonstrated in Endgame, a decision is made to 
continue the repetition that leads to the risus purus. Levy emphasizes, "Reflection 
then, is a positive series of acts, a process, an effort to do rather than to indulge in 
self-pity; it is a desire for knowledge and love for people. It is, finally a (performative) 
creation of an act rather than a description of one" (8-9). Driven by the artistic 
obligation, Hamm's repetitive words and actions are proof of his effort to put off the 
end a little longer. Therefore, the risus purus, a product of conscious choice and 
action, attests to the courage one has to face the impossibly difficult circumstances. 
Even if the sound of such laughter is increasingly indistinguishable from the sound of 
crying, Beckett reminds us that laughter also begins in "eyewater" {Watt 48). Coming 
full circle, laughter is Sisyphus's rock; it may be tiring, it may not go anywhere, but 
as long as one lives, one must continue to go on with it. 
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Chapter 3: Laughter and Self-Knowledge in Pinter 's The Birthday Party 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we have looked at Endgame and the laughter it produces. 
It is, as Beckett has said, the last laugh; like everything else in the play, it eventually 
dies, runs out of supply. As the highest joke一unhappiness一gets told over and over 
again, it no longer raises a laugh. After that, it would seem we are left in a world 
where laughing is difficult, if not impossible. However, to Harold Pinter, the show, 
and its accompanying laughter, must go on. Writing at a time when Beckett had 
attained his fame and the Theatre of the Absurd had become a recognizable form of 
modern drama, Pinter took up the challenge of retelling a now-familiar joke. By 
presenting and reflecting on the absurd human condition in a new way in his plays, 
Pinter affirms that there is more than one way to laugh at oneself. In this chapter, we 
will use Pinter's play The Birthday Party as an example to show that, while the risus 
purus leads to its own apparent end, it yet serves a purpose. 
After watching Pinter's play The Caretaker, a journalist wrote an open letter to 
express his distress at the audience finding the old tramp funny (Esslin, Pinter 50). 
His feeling of disturbance points to the main problem of the risus purus, which is, 
after all, "the laugh that laughs...at that which is unhappy." To this letter, Pinter 
replied: 
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But where the comic and the tragic...are closely interwoven, certain 
members of the audience will always give emphasis to the comic as 
opposed to the other, for by so doing they rationalize the other out of 
existence... This laughter is in fact a mode of precaution, a smoke-screen, a 
refusal to accept what is happening as recognizable...and instead to view 
the actors (a) as actors always and not as characters and (b) as 
chimpanzees....As far as I'm concerned, The Caretaker is funny, up to a 
point. Beyond that point it ceases to be funny, and it was because of that 
point that I wrote it. (qtd. in Esslin, Pinter 50-51) 
Like Beckett, Pinter sees an eventual e n d e v e n a definite ending point一to the 
laughter generated by unhappiness. However, for Pinter, the mirthless laughter is not 
an end unto itself; instead, he sees something beyond the laughter. It is even implied 
that this something is discovered only through this laughter, for Pinter sees the point 
at which it turns into silence as the reason he writes his plays. No doubt, this laughter 
serves a purpose, even if it is indeed directed at unhappiness. 
Beckett's Influence and the Risus Purus in Pinter's Theatre 
To find out what this purpose is, we must establish that the laughter of Pinter's 
plays is indeed, like the laughter of Beckett's, the risus purus. Pinter acknowledges 
Beckett's influence on him: "When I read [Beckett] it rang a bell, that's all, within me. 
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I thought: 'something is going on here which is going on in me too'" (qtd. in Esslin, 
Pinter 36). Certainly, it is not difficult to recognize this influence in Pinter's works. 
Ruby Colin points out, "If Pinter has repeatedly been named as Beckett's heir on the 
English stage, it is because the characters of both lead lives of complex and unquiet 
desperation" (25). If Beckett's characters are placed in dustbins or deathbeds or in the 
middle of a wasteland, Pinter's characters are likewise put in unenviable situations. 
For example, in Endgame, Clov wants to leave the house but cannot because there is 
only death outside; the world outside depicted in The Birthday Party is just as deadly, 
as Pinter explains, "Obviously, [the characters] are scared of what is outside the room. 
Outside the room is a world bearing upon them, which is frightening.. .’，(qtd. in 
Esslin, Pinter 35). Unlike Clov, Stanley would like to stay in the room, but is dragged 
out in the end. Even though the premises are different, both plays illustrate a 
dangerous world that constantly preys on the individual. Hence, by placing his 
characters in situations not of their choosing and in which they are completely 
helpless, Pinter shares in Beckett's gloomy vision of the human condition. 
Nevertheless, out of this miserable existence they see, both playwrights managed 
to create comedies. Leigh Harbin notes, "Pinter's drama, like Beckett's, initiates us 
into a world that we don't particularly want to enter, yet once we find ourselves there, 
we laugh at the uncanny sense of recognition" (5). Through well-placed words and 
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pauses, Beckett and Pinter draw the audience into a world at once nightmarish and 
comic. In the previous chapter, we have seen that the characters of Endgame often 
pause before laughing, highlighting the reflective nature of the risus purus. In doing 
so, the audience is encouraged to ponder upon their own laughter. Pinter also 
emphasizes the importance of silence in his plays. In his aforementioned reply, he 
criticizes the "indiscriminate mirth" and "uneasy jollification" some people use to 
deny what they are witnessing on stage (qtd. in Esslin 50, 51). Critics have also noted 
that in some of Pinter's later performances, the audience's conditioned and 
indiscriminate laughter destroyed the effect of the play (Knowles 51 -2). On the other 
hand, Pinter commends the "sensible balance of laughter and silence" the majority of 
the audience keeps during the performance (qtd. in Esslin, Pinter 50). Ronald 
Knowles maintains that there are two levels of audience response: "the primary 
response at an emotional level to the immediacy of the dramatic moment, and the 
secondary level that is largely retroactive...by which we begin to recognize a content 
beyond the affective" (31). Obviously, the risus purus belongs to the second level, 
where the audience stops laughing when the reality of what they are laughing at sinks 
in. Pinter's stress on the silence after and in between laughter indicates that, as in 
Beckett's plays, his laughter is intended to be an opening for reflection. The self-
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reflexive nature of such laughter, an unhappy laugh directed at unhappiness, is the 
defining characteristic of the risus purus. 
On the other hand, while similar in nature, the laughter of Pinter cannot be said 
to be exactly the same as Beckett's. Their different views of the risus purus are 
manifest in the plots of their plays. Andrew Kennedy observes, "The structure of 
many Pinter plays...can be plotted as a half-submerged but otherwise forward-moving 
action {implicit exposition, denouement, and so on), while Beckett's plays turn in a 
static-perennial cycle" (64). Time repeats itself into a standstill in Beckett's plays, 
while in Pinter's it continues to flow, however sluggishly. Laughter functions in the 
same fashion for the two playwrights. We recall Nell's words in Endgame, that even 
though we laugh at unhappiness, "it's always the same thing." For Beckett, the risus 
purus is the last laugh, because in repetition it eventually quiets down. On the 
contrary, it has already been mentioned that Pinter sees a definite point where laughter 
gives way to something else. This disparity reveals that the mode of laughter一and by 
extension, the mode of survival一in an absurd world is quite different for Beckett and 
Pinter. 
Another major difference between the two playwrights is the setting of their 
plays. While Beckett's plays often take place in a dreamlike, minimalistic realm, 
Pinter's stage is set in real life (Esslin, Pinter 36, Harbin 2, Cohn 26). Knowles calls it 
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"mid-20"^-century 'kitchen-sink' realism" (31). The naturalistic setting of Pinter's 
plays contributes greatly to their comic quality. In contrast to Beckett's characters, 
Pinter's characters speak a language so close to everyday speech that it has been 
described as "hyper-naturalistic" (Esslin, Pinter 37). His language一Pinteresque 
language, as it has come to be known—shows that everyday language is filled with 
"bad syntax, tautologies, pleonasms, repetitions, non sequiturs and self-
contradictions" (Ronald Hayman, qtd. in Kennedy 63). The naturalistic setting and 
language encourage the audience to identify with the life portrayed on stage, and 
when they laugh, they are reminded that they are in effect laughing at themselves. 
Pinter and Comedies of Menace 
Despite the realistic setting and dialogue of Pinter's plays, the events that take 
place are often strange and absurd. The bizarre fates of the characters prevent these 
plays from being classified into the comfortable genre of domestic drama (Harbin 4). 
This is particularly true of his early plays—The Room, The Birthday Party, A Slight 
Ache, and to a lesser degree, The Caretaker—commonly known as "comedy of 
menace." The term "comedy of menace" was originally the subtitle of the play The 
Lunatic View by David Campton, a play on the term "comedy of manners" (Esslin, 
Pinter 51). It was then adopted by critic Irving Wardle when he reviewed several 
plays—including Pinter's The Birthday Party~in 1958 (Esslin, Pinter 5 \). Despite 
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Wardle's retraction of the phrase two years later and Pinter's dismissal of it as a 
limiting view of his plays, "comedy of menace" has remained popular as a label. 
These plays share the characteristic of starting out in a room, a warm, safe shelter 
from the frightening outside world. However, the delicate peace maintained in the 
room must inevitably be destroyed. In the program brochure of The Room and The 
Dumb Waiter in London in 1960, Pinter included an introduction to these plays: 
Given a man in a room and he will sooner or later receive a visitor. A visitor 
entering the room will enter with intent.. .A man in a room and no one 
entering lives in expectation of a visit. He will be illuminated or horrified by 
the absence of a visitor. But however much it is expected, the entrance, 
when it comes, is unexpected and almost always unwelcome, (qtd. in Esslin, 
Pinter 40) 
It has already been noted that the audience is often troubled and confused by such 
plays, especially when horrible things happen to characters leading normal lives. 
Critics also responded negatively to these plays when they were first performed: some 
of them opposed to the mixing of "microscopic naturalism" and "'absurdist' patterns," 
while some simply called them "madness" (Kennedy 102, Esslin, Pinter 18). 
Even so, the juxtaposition of these two styles is vital to the production of the 
risus purus in these plays. As the paradoxical name "comedy of menace" suggests, 
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these plays induce laughter in spite and because of the sense of foreboding that 
permeates them. In the beginning, the naturalistic setting and dialog allow the 
audience to identify with the characters and provide easy comic relief. When sinister 
visitors appear on the doorstep, they appear so out of place that the audience again 
laughs. These early comic scenes, however, often foreshadow non-comic outcomes 
(Dukore 107). When normal life starts to disintegrate on stage, the audience is forced 
to entertain the possibility that such threat exists in real life. Pinter, who grew up as a 
Jewish boy during the Second World War, plainly says so when commenting on The 
Birthday Party: 
Again this man is hidden away in a seaside boarding house. • .then two 
people arrive out of nowhere, and I don't consider this an unnatural 
happening. I don't think it is all that surrealistic and curious because surely 
this thing, of people arriving at the door, has been happening in Europe in 
the last twenty years, (qtd. in Esslin, Pinter 36) 
By depicting a threat that constantly lurks outside the door, "comedy of menace" 
reveals to the audience that the normalcy of everyday life is, like the performance 
they are watching, simply an act; it is one that everyone participates in day after day. 
Laughter at the characters on stage bounces back at the audience as they are reminded 
that they, too, are actors in the same play. This laughter is then slowly replaced by the 
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chilling knowledge that the world outside the theatre is no less absurdly menacing 
than the world portrayed on stage. 
The Risus Purus and Self-Knowledge 
Indeed, laughter and knowledge are closely related in Pinter's plays; the former's 
ultimate function is to bring about the latter. In this, Pinter is following a line of 
thought first suggested by Plato. We have seen how Plato argues in Philebus that the 
self-ignorant are the most laughable of all. On this point, Bergson adds, "The comic 
person is unconscious" (16). That is, not only does the comic object lack self-
knowledge, he is not aware of this particular defect of himself. Bergson believes that 
"a defect that is ridiculous, as soon as it feels itself to be so, endeavors to modify itself, 
or at least to appear as though it did" (17). If it does not, we no longer find it comic, 
but perhaps find it obstinate and reviling. Therefore, laughter is corrective; it imparts 
knowledge to those who lack it, and thus assists them in modifying their behavior. In 
the case of the risus purus, the person laughing and the one being laughed at are the 
same. The moment the audience realizes that they share in the folly they are laughing 
at, the knowledge they are trying to pass on through laughter rebounds on them. They 
learn something about themselves that they were not aware of before, and this gain in 
self-knowledge stops them from laughing. In time the risus purus must stop, because 
the comic object is no loner comic. This is the point that Pinter says he writes for, the 
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point when laughter gives way to silence. In other words, he writes for the moment 
when self-knowledge is attained. 
Uncertainty and Menace 
Why, then, is self-knowledge so important to Pinter? For one, Pinter believes 
that the human condition has become absurd and menacing because people have 
failed or refused to gain a correct understanding of themselves and others. This sense 
of uncertainty is always a source of menace. Francesca Coppa explains, "Menace 
depends on ignorance; the terror of it stems from the vagueness of the threat. We do 
not know what is happening or why, and the lack of information leads us to fear the 
worst: that the threat is somehow beyond articulation一literally unspeakable" (51). 
Pinter, unswerving in his philosophy that humans are unknowable, finds no comfort in 
his knowledge of himself. In an interview, he says, "Sometimes, I don't know who I 
am looking at in the mirror. There's no explanation for that face" (qtd. in Esslin, 
Pinter 38). And if the self is not fully knowable, it is much less likely that one can 
know others. Once a member of the audience wrote a letter to Pinter after watching 
The Birthday Party, demanding to know: “1. Who are the two men? 2. Where did 
Stanley come from? 3. Were they all supposed to be normal? You will appreciate that 
without the answers to my questions I cannot fully understand your play" (qtd. in 
Esslin, Pinter 37). Purportedly, Pinter answered, 
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Dear Madam, I would be obliged if you would kindly explain to me the 
meaning of your letter. These are the points which I do not understand: 1. 
Who are you? 2. Where do you come from? 3. Are you supposed to be 
normal? You will appreciate that without the answers to my questions I 
cannot fully understand your letter, (qtd. in Esslin, Pinter 37-8) 
More than simply tongue-in-cheek, Pinter is highlighting the mistrust that exists 
within the human race. Since our species cannot read minds, it is impossible to verify 
the identity and motivation of anyone. The possibility of deceit constantly lies 
between two human beings, and communication of meaning is always ineffective, 
even traitorous. 
Pinter captures the menacing mood of the real world by recreating the sense of 
uncertainty among people on stage. Generally, not much is known about Pinter's 
characters, and what little bits of information are revealed often contradict each other 
and remain mysteries at the end of the play. For an audience that is used to receiving 
exposition of the characters' background, feelings and motivation, Pinter's characters 
are baffling and frustrating. A review of The Birthday Party reads: "What all this 
means, only Mr. Pinter knows, for as his characters speak in non-sequiturs, half-
gibberish and lunatic ravings, they are unable to explain their actions, thoughts and 
feelings" (qtd. in Esslin, Pinter 18). Nevertheless, Pinter resolutely rejects the idea 
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that a playwright may explain his characters completely (Esslin, Pinter 39). He insists 
that his characters are thinking beings, not mouthpieces placed on stage "to speak for 
the author who has a point of view to put over" (qtd. in Esslin, Pinter 38). In a letter 
to Peter Wood, the director of the first production of The Birthday Party, he writes: 
"The characters sounded in my ears—it was apparent to me what one would say and 
what would be the other's response, at any given point. It was apparent to me what 
they would not, could not, ever, say, whatever one might wish" (qtd. in Esslin, Pinter 
79). As such, he cannot give any further clarification on them "straight from the 
horse's mouth" (qtd. in Esslin, Pinter 80). By portraying characters that are not 
absolutely knowable, Pinter's plays underline the danger of assuming knowledge 
about oneself and others, and encourage the audience to learn more about themselves. 
This aspect is especially important in The Birthday Party, which, more than anything 
else, is a play about uncertainty. The following analysis shall demonstrate how The 
Birthday Party, by displaying characters of various levels of self-ignorance, 
misinformation and deception, induces the risus purus, a critical weapon in fighting 
off the menacing world. 
A Synopsis of The Birthday Party 
The Birthday Party is a three-act play that takes place over the course of 24 
hours in a boarding house next to the seaside. It opens with what many critics describe 
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as a "naturalistic" scene, with Meg preparing breakfast for her husband Petey. They 
talk about cornflakes, fried bread and stories in the newspaper. Petey mentions two 
men coming to the boarding house. Meg then goes to wake up Stanley, their only 
boarder. Stanley is a man in his late thirties, who reportedly has been a pianist before. 
Unlike Petey, Stanley does not quietly put up with Meg's motherly and sometimes 
flirtatious ministrations, but appears impatient and frustrated. He is alarmed by the 
news that two men are coming to the house. At this point, a visitor comes by. It is 
Lulu, the pretty girl that lives next door, and she has come over to deliver a parcel. It 
turns out to be Stanley's birthday, and the parcel contains his birthday present. Two 
men, Goldberg and McCann, also arrive. They meet with Meg, and after learning that 
it's Stanley's birthday, decide to throw him a birthday party. 
In Act 2, Stanley meets the two men. He is forced to sit down and is cross-
interrogated by a barrage of nonsensical questions. He is broken after this scene, 
becoming mostly silent for the rest of the play, except to make the occasional grunt or 
groan. After that, the birthday party begins. Meg is dressed in an evening dress and 
she makes a toast. Lulu becomes attracted to Goldberg. After they all drink, they play 
a game of blind man's buff. When it is Stanley's turn to be the blind man, he tries to 
strangle Meg and rape Lulu. He giggles madly when Goldberg and McCann advance 
upon him. 
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Act 3 starts as if the party has never happened, with Petey again at the table and 
Meg preparing breakfast. However, Stanley, who is now dressed in a black suit and 
unintelligible, reminds the audience that the nightmarish Act 2 did take place. Petey 
tries to stop Goldberg and McCann from taking Stanley away, but his feeble effort is 
countered easily by Goldberg, who invites him to come along. After the trio have left, 
Meg returns. Petey holds his tongue, while Meg, unaware of the situation, reminisces 
about the party. 
The Non-Comic Consequences of Comic Ignorance 
Out of all the characters, Meg most fully represents the ignorant comic figure. 
This is shown immediately in the opening scenes of the play, as she fires a series of 
questions at Petey: "Is that you?", "Are you back?", and "You got your paper?", even 
though he is sitting right there in the living room with a newspaper propped up in 
front of him (9). That her questioning is routine is apparent in Petey's resigned, curt 
responses: 
Meg: Is [the paper] good? 
Petey: Not bad. 
Meg: What does it say? 
Petey: Nothing much. •.. 
Meg: What time did you go out this morning, Petey? 
Petey: Same time as usual. (10) 
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Meg's persistence and banal questions show her to be more like a little girl than a 
woman in her sixties. This disparate image continues as she serves Petey breakfast. In 
the space of about 70 lines, she uses the phrase "is it nice" or "is it good" 5 times to 
make sure that Petey is satisfied with what she provides. She has also prepared a 
surprise other than cornflakes for him. 
Meg: Here you are, Petey...Is it nice? 
Petey: I haven't tasted it yet. 
Meg: I bet you don't know what it is. 
Petey: Yes, I do. 
Meg: What is it, then? 
Petey: Fried bread. 
Meg: That's right. (11-12) 
Meg serves breakfast not as a morning ritual she has been doing for years, but as a 
game between newly-weds; her eagerness to please and her playfulness are so 
inappropriate to a woman of her age that they make her comical (Alexander 100-101). 
If Meg's interaction with Petey is silly, she appears downright ridiculous in her 
relationship with Stanley. Though Stanley is already a man in his late thirties, Meg 
mothers him as if he were still a little boy. She wakes him up, brings tea to his room, 
prepares breakfast for him, even taking to tickling him and ruffling his hair. For 
Stanley's birthday, Meg gives him a boy's drum一"because [he hasn't] got a 
piano"一and asks for a kiss in return (36). What is funny about the birthday present is 
8 3 
not only that Meg finds a toy drum and a piano similar enough to replace one with 
another, but also that she believes the toy makes a suitable gift to a grown man. 
Moreover, Meg does not treat Stanley merely as a son, but also as a young lover. She 
frequently attempts to flirt with him, and seems to think that the romantic feeling is 
reciprocated. In one of the funniest exchanges in the play, Stanley uses the word 
"succulent" to describe the fried bread he is eating, and Meg, not knowing what the 
word means, objects that he "shouldn't say that word to a married woman" (17). 
Rather viciously, Stanley keeps using the word to mock Meg, but she misunderstands 
his intention: 
Meg: {shyly). Am I really succulent? 
Stanley: Oh, you are. I'd rather have you than a cold in the nose any 
day. 
Meg: You're just saying that. 
Stanley: {violently). Look, why don't you get this place cleared up! It's 
a pigsty. And another thing, what about my room? It needs 
sweeping. It needs paper. I need a new room! 
Meg: {sensual, stroking his arm). Oh, Stan, that's a lovely room. 
I've had some lovely afternoons in that room. (19) 
Meg's flirting is shown to be utterly unreasonable in this scene, highlighted by the 
contrast between her "shy" and "sensual" demeanor and Stanley's sarcasm and anger. 
Not only does Meg not have a correct understanding of herself, she is oblivious of the 
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true opinion of others of her. The misconceptions Meg harbors concerning herself and 
those around her, which affect her interactions with others, make her a risible 
character. 
Adding to Meg's comicality is her complete unawareness of her own defects. As 
shown in her conversations with Petey and Stanley, she mostly ignores the response 
of others and persists in what she is doing and saying. The inability of getting through 
to Meg has rendered Petey resigned and Stanley increasingly enraged. However, she 
remains unmoved and sure of herself. For example, in the toast she gives at the party, 
she says, "And he's the only Stanley I know, and I know him better than all the 
world" (55). Her words are funny because they are so far away from the truth, but the 
real comical effect comes from the sobbing that accompanies the speech, as it 
becomes clear that Meg believes in every word that she is saying. Furthermore, Meg 
has a habit of using the phrase—ironically— "I know it is" to confirm and reassure 
others, perhaps even herself, of what she has said. The play ends with her recalling the 
party, saying, “I was the belle of the ball... Oh, it's true. I was. (Pause.) I know I was" 
(87). Apparently, the terrible events happened the night before have not made any 
impression on Meg, or perhaps she is, as some critics argue, "merely trying to hang on 
to the illusion that everything is still as it was, that the disastrous party was not a 
disaster but the success she had hoped for it" (Esslin, Pinter 203). Either way, her 
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mistaken notion of herself is not to be altered. Her unshakable cluelessness makes her 
the last remaining comic character. 
However, while Meg's ignorance is laughable, it brings consequences that are no 
laughing matter. First of all, she asks Stanley to stay in the house and forget about 
anything that happens outside its walls. When Stanley talks about his past, Meg 
replies, "Don't you go away again, Stan. You stay here. You'll be better off. You stay 
with your old Meg" (23). In effect, she is encouraging Stanley to disregard his past 
and future and stay in the safety that she provides, but as we shall see, this proves to 
be Stanley's downfall. Furthermore, the house is not as safe and comfortable as Meg 
imagines. As Bernard Dukore points out, Meg's suffocating attention is not so 
dissimilar from Goldberg and McCann's methods, in that they both overlook 
Stanley's complaints and force him to do something he does not want to do (107). 
Meg is also not able to stop Stanley from being taken away. While she instinctively 
senses a danger outside (a hearse-like van with a wheelbarrow in it), she is unable to 
recognize it when it comes knocking at her door (Colin 85). Even after the event, she 
stays unaware of the true nature of her visitors and the evil they've carried out in her 
home: 
Meg: Well...I mean...is there.• .is there a wheelbarrow in [the 
car]?... 
Petey: What would Mr. Goldberg want with a wheelbarrow? 
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Meg: Mr. Goldberg? 
Petey:: It's his car. 
Meg: {relieved). His car? Oh, I didn't know it was his car...Oh, I 
feel better. (69) 
Undoubtedly, Meg's ignorance is the reason that the safe haven she tries so hard to 
create falls apart. Her comic words and actions have brought about the non-comic end 
of Stanley. 
On the other hand, there is another female character, Lulu, whose main role is to 
act as a foil to Meg. Young and sexually attractive, Lulu is the exact opposite of Meg, 
a combination of "pert knowingness and simplemindedness" (Knowles 57). Her 
"knowingness" is shown in her grasp of the happenings in the Boles household. For 
instance, she questions Stanley's role in the house. She asks Stanley, “I mean, what do 
you do, just sit around the house like this all day long? (Pause.) Hasn't Mrs. Boles got 
enough to do without you under her feet all day long?" (25) She suggests him to shave 
and wash, and invites him to go out for a walk because he is a depressing sight in the 
house (26). When Stanley turns her down, she says frankly, "You're a bit of a washed 
out, aren't you?" (26). Unlike Meg, Lulu is not at all impressed by Stanley's story that 
he was once a pianist; she only sees him as a jobless bum taking up room in the house. 
In other words, she sees Stanley in a way that Meg does not see and Stanley does not 
want to be seen. Therefore, if Meg represents a forgiving space in which Stanley can 
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happily ignore anything outside. Lulu is the force that pulls him out into the bright 
harsh truth. 
Yet, Lulu and all her sharpness in front of Stanley is no match for Goldberg. 
Enraptured by Goldberg's speech, Lulu displays an ignorance—innocence, perhaps, 
given her much younger age一similar to Meg's. Almost immediately after she meets 
Goldberg, she expresses that she trusts the stranger: 
Lulu: {to Goldberg). Shall I tell you something? 
Goldberg: What? 
Lulu: I trust you. 
Goldberg: {lifting his glass). Gesundheit. (59) 
Her trust is comic, especially because it is so unfounded. Even Goldberg replies with 
"gesundheit," as if her declaration of trust is nothing more than a sneeze. Like a bad 
cold, Lulu's misguided trust in Goldberg eventually causes her ruin. She accuses 
Goldberg the morning after the party: “You quenched your ugly thirst. You taught me 
things a girl shouldn't know before she's been married at least three times!" (80) As 
Lulu gets to know Goldberg—in the biblical sense, it may be presumed—her 
innocence is taken away from her, replaced by the knowledge of the real disposition 
of Goldberg. The affair opens Lulu's eyes, enabling her to say, "I 've seen everything 
that's happened. I know what's going on. I've got a pretty shrewd idea" (81). This 
recognition has arrived too late, as there is no reversing the events of the night. Lulu 
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cries in distress, "What would my father say, if he knew?" (79) Just as Eve hurriedly 
covers herself with leaves and hides after eating the forbidden fruit of knowledge, 
Lulu has to pay the price for her knowledge, which carries with it notions of shame 
and repercussion. Thus, Lulu's ignorance ceases to be comic as soon as it is replaced 
by knowledge. 
The Danger of Self-Deception 
From the examples of Meg and Lulu, we have seen how comic ignorance may 
lead to non-comic consequences. This statement cannot be truer than when applied to 
Stanley, the protagonist of the play. In the beginning, Stanley does not seem to be 
ignorant at all; in particular, in his interaction with Meg, he frequently gains the upper 
hand by showing that he knows something she doesn't. A case in point is when he 
tells Meg about the hearse-like van coming around to fetch someone: 
Stanley: Meg. Do you know what? 
Meg: What?... 
Stanley: {advancing). They're coming today. They're coming in a 
van. 
Meg: Who? 
Stanley: And do you know what they've got in that van? 
Meg: What? 
Stanley: They've got a wheelbarrow in that van. 
Meg: (breathlessly). They haven't. 
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Stanley: Oh yes they have. 
Meg: You're a liar. 
Stanley: (advancing upon her). A big wheelbarrow. And when the 
van stops they wheel it out, and they wheel it up the garden 
path, and then they knock at the front door. 
Meg: They don't. 
Stanley: They're looking for someone. 
Meg: They're not. 
Stanley: They're looking for someone. A certain person. 
Meg: {hoarsely). No, they're not! 
Stanley: Shall I tell you who they're looking for? 
Meg: No! 
Stanley: You don't want me to tell you? 
Meg: You're a liar! (23-4) 
Previous to this scene, Stanley has just been told that two visitors are coming to the 
boarding house. Like Meg, he panics and denies that they will come. However, he 
quickly turns the table on Meg by projecting his own fear onto her. In a series of 
questions, he demonstrates that he holds secret information regarding these menacing 
visitors, and terrifies Meg by revealing it bit by bit. Therefore, it is established early in 
the play that knowledge equals power. 
Nonetheless, even in the first act, Stanley's knowledge is questionable. When 
Meg plays with Stanley the guessing game she has played with Petey previously, 
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Stanley answers that it is fried bread she is giving him, and Meg pronounces, "He 
knew" (16). The truth is, Petey has told Stanley the answer before Meg enters the 
living room. Later, when Goldberg and McCann interrogate Stanley, it becomes 
evident that, in fact, "he doesn't know，，(52). His ignorance is of a different kind than 
Meg's or Lulu's in that it pertains mostly to himself and appears to be self-imposed. 
For example, when he talks about his past, he continuously changes his story. About 
his career as a pianist, he says, "I've played the piano all over the world. All over the 
country. (Pause.) I once gave a concert" (22). His words are comic because his effort 
to impress Meg is undercut by the reductive revisions he makes. And again, when 
talking about his father, he says, "My father nearly came down to hear me. Well, I 
dropped him a card anyway. But I don't think he could make it. No, I—I lost the 
address, that was it" (23). Here, it is evident that Stanley cannot cope with his past 
and must make excuses to explain events that trouble him. 
Not only is Stanley unable to face his past, he is also unable to move forward 
into the future. When he learns that visitors are coming, he becomes fearful and 
envisions an escape. He tells Meg that he has been offered a job and is about to leave: 
Stanley: Berlin. A night club. Playing the piano. A fabulous salary. 
And all found. 
Meg: How long for? 
Stanley: We don't stay in Berlin. Then we go to Athens. 
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Meg: How long for? 
Stanley: Yes, then we pay a flying visit to... er... whatsisname... 
Meg: Where? 
Stanley: Constantinople. Zagreb. Vladivostock. It's a round the world 
tour. (22) 
Though obviously made up on the spot, Stanley's plan of escape represents the 
potential of what his life could be. However, as he dodges Meg's questions about his 
departure, the cities he lists appear more and more like "a sketch-like roll-call of 
exotic venues" than places he would actually go (Knowles 61). Later, he again 
proposes to Lulu his plan to escape and asks her to come with him, but this time he 
admits: "Nowhere. There's no where to go" (26). In the end, Stanley has not managed 
to leave. Unable to embrace the past and fearing the future, he chooses to stay in the 
security that Meg provides. The price of doing so is that he must become iiifantilized 
in Meg's motherly but overwhelming affection. When he first receives the toy drum 
from Meg, he is greatly insulted, but he suppresses his true desire of walking out and 
complies with Meg's wish. His submission is shown in his body language: "His 
shoulders sag, he bends and kisses her on the cheek" (36). He then puts the drum 
around his neck and begins playing with it, fully fitting into the role of a little boy that 
Meg has assigned him. His subsequent drumming, which starts out in regular beats, 
gradually turns "savage and possessed," as if the anger that he represses can no longer 
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be kept under control (36). Hence, the downfall of Stanley as a result of denying his 
true self is foreshadowed before the visitors show up. 
The previous paragraphs have established that Stanley's self-ignorance is a result 
of self-deception. Fabricating his own past and future and suppressing his desires and 
emotions, Stanley has lost sight of who he really is. Earlier, he has asked Meg 
gloomily, "Who do you think you're talking to?…Tell me, Mrs. Boles, when you 
address yourself to me, do you ever ask yourself exactly who you are talking to? Eh?" 
(21) As it turns out, he too cannot answer this question. It is no wonder that, in the 
interrogation that causes his breakdown, Goldberg and McCann uses this against him. 
Goldberg: Who does he think he is? 
McCann: Who do you think you are? 
Stanley: You're on the wrong horse. 
Goldberg: When did you come to this place? 
Stanley: Last year. 
Goldberg: Where did you come from? 
Stanley: Somewhere else. 
Goldberg: Why did you come here? 
Stanley: My feet hurt! 
Goldberg: Why did you stay? 
Stanley: I had a headache! (48) 
The questions that Goldberg and McCann ask are concerned with Stanley's identity 
and motivation, aspects we have shown to be hidden to Stanley himself. Therefore, 
9 3 
even though he tries to give unspecific answers in the beginning, he soon starts 
avoiding the questions. Bombarding him with such inquiries—some make sense and 
some don't~Goldberg and McCann confuse Stanley even more, getting him to say 
that his name is "Joe Soap" and accusing him to have killed the wife he never had 
(49-50). Then, they deliver their final blow by forcing Stanley to confront his self-
ignorance: 
Goldberg: Speak up, Webber. Why did the chicken cross the road? 
Stanley: He wanted to一he wanted to一he wanted to... 
McCann: He doesn't know! 
Goldberg: Why did the chicken cross the road? 
Stanley: He wanted to一he wanted to... 
Goldberg: Why did the chicken cross the road? 
Stanley: He wanted... 
McCann: He doesn't know. He doesn't know which came first! 
Goldberg: Which came first? 
McCann: Chicken? Egg? Which came first? 




Goldberg He doesn't know. Do you know your own face? (51 -52) 
The first question Goldberg asks is a familiar joke: "Why did the chicken cross the 
road?" The answer is simple: "He wanted to get to the other side." As Goldberg 
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throws out the first line of a joke, the audience prepares for laughter, but laughter is 
thwarted because Stanley cannot deliver the punch line. He is stuck on "he wanted 
to.. . ," unable to articulate what it is that he wants or where he wants to go. Similarly, 
Goldberg's second question is a familiar one. To the age-old paradox of whether the 
chicken or the egg comes first, Goldberg says: "Who came before your father? His 
father. And who came before him? Before him?... Who came before your father's 
father but your father's father's mother! Your great-gran-granny" (78). His answer 
signifies that his question is actually about one's connection to his forebears, to those 
who have come before him. Seeing that Stanley is unable to answer either question, 
Goldberg pronounces triumphantly, "You're dead. You can't live, you can't think, 
you can't love. You're dead" (52). Indeed, for a person who doesn't know about his 
past, his future, and his motivation for living from day to day, his existence is but a 
fagade. Forced to acknowledge this fact of himself, Stanley is reduced to a quiet, 
zombie-like being. 
The Breakdown of the Individual under Fake and Imposed Philosophy 
Lastly, we come to the characters Goldberg and McCann. Agents of an unknown 
organization, they are the vehicles of menace in the play. They recall the two hitmen, 
Ben and Gus, in Pinter's earlier play The Dumb Waiter (Cohn 85). Their power is 
derived from their language, which is "more pat, more cliche-ridden, with more brute 
9 5 
power than that of their victims'" (Cohn 27). In their interrogation of Stanley, they 
display their prowess in speaking and their knowledge of Stanley's secrets, thus 
breaking down the stuttering Stanley. Of the two, Goldberg appears to be the senior 
partner, showing himself to be more eloquent and informed—and therefore more 
powerful—than McCann. He frequently talks about his past life experiences, but his 
history remains ambiguous. For instance, Goldberg claims his name is "Nat," 
"Simey" and "Benny" on three different occasions (27, 43, 78). He also relentlessly 
gives advice and shares sayings of wisdom, though these are not more trustworthy 
than his past. In one of his speeches, he praises the miracle of birth: "What a thing to 
celebrate—birth! Like getting up in the morning. Marvelous! ...Because I know what 
it is to wake up with the sun shining, to the sound of the lawnmower, all the little 
birds, the smell of the grass, church bells, tomato juice一，，(45) In another, he says, “I 
believe in a good laugh, a day's fishing, a bit of gardening. I was very proud of my 
old greenhouse, made out of my own spit and faith. That's the sort of man I am. Not 
size but quality. A little Austin, tea in Fullers, a library book from Boots, and I'm 
satisfied" (56). With these popular and widely-accepted adages, Goldberg is able to 
present himself as a charming and sensible person. Lulu, for example, is attracted to 
Goldberg only after his toast at the birthday party (56). At closer inspection, 
Goldberg's sayings seldom have anything to do with the context or the topic at hand. 
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Judging from the cruel way he treats Stanley, it also doesn't seem likely that he 
actually practices what he preaches. His words, then, are merely cliches that require 
little prompting to spill forth from his mouth. As Pinter says, "There are two silences. 
One when no word is spoken. The other when perhaps a torrent of language is 
employed" (qtd. in Esslin, Pinter 46). In effect, Goldberg manages to say nothing by 
saying a lot of words. It can therefore be said that Goldberg's power is fake一it draws 
strength not from any real knowledge, but from his conviction that his knowledge is 
real. When he first steps onto the stage, Goldberg is an image of confidence, saying, 
"Sure I'm sure" (27). But after the party, he starts to have doubts concerning himself. 
Like Gus in The Dumb Waiter, when Goldberg starts to question his job, he becomes 
the victim of the violence he is hired to carry out (Coppa 48). He first reacts greatly— 
"murderously"—when McCann calls him "Simey," a name and identity that has 
perhaps never belonged to him (76). Then, he suffers a breakdown like Stanley's. He 
tries to recite the proverbs he has used before, to convince himself that they are true: 
Goldberg: Leam by heart. Never write down a thing. And don't go too 
near the water. 
And you'll find~that what I say is true. 
Because I believe that the world...(Vacant)... 
Because I believe that the world...(Desperate.)… 
BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT THE WORLD...(Lost.)... 
(77-8) 
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Like Stanley, Goldberg fails to finish the sentence, to state what he believes in; he has 
gone too near the water, and, seeing his own reflection, he is unable to find what he 
said to be true. His unfinished sentence denotes the final "logorrhea into vacancy," the 
loss of significance of his words (Kennedy 104). Afterwards, Goldberg is able to 
recover by reverting to the comfort of mindless cliches, but his temporary breakdown 
has sufficiently verified the threatening consequences of self-delusion. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has begun with the premise that the laughter generated in a Pinter 
play is the risus purus, for the purpose of producing a higher sense of awareness 
within the audience. However, by the end of The Birthday Party, one must wonder 
whether such knowledge is a blessing or a curse. The morning after the party, 
everyone is changed in some way. Lulu, having lost her innocence the night before, 
learns the true nature of Goldberg and now fears that her father may discover what 
has happened. Stanley, being forced to face a self that he finds unbearable and has 
hidden from himself for a long time, loses his ability to speak and make decisions. 
Even Goldberg seems to doubt the doctrines he has held onto throughout the play. 
The only character untouched by a newfound knowledge is Meg, and she is able to 
reminisce about the "lovely" party and the dancing and singing and games they had 
(87). Her world has remained simple, so much so that Petey is unable to break to her 
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the news that Stanley has been taken away. When Meg tries to go wake Stanley up, he 
says, "Let him... sleep" (87). Petey implies that it would have been better if Stanley 
had never woken up to the truth. At the same time, his words keep Meg in the dark; in 
other words, he is letting her sleep for a little longer (Cohn 86). The conclusion of the 
play seems to suggest that the gaining of knowledge is not necessarily a good thing, 
that it is easier to live without scrutinizing life too hard or knowing too much. In the 
same way, if the risus purus should eventually stop and leave the audience in a sober 
but laughter-less state, perhaps it is better not to have started laughing at all. 
At the same time, however, The Birthday Party confirms that ignorance brings 
menace, with the ignorance concerning oneself being particularly dangerous. We may 
not blame Meg for not recognizing Goldberg and McCann for who they are and 
opening her door to usher them in; we may not blame Lulu, who has never met such a 
charismatic character in her young life, for falling for the charm of Goldberg; yet, we 
cannot help but feel that, if Stanley has been able to stand his ground during the 
interrogation, if he has known himself well enough to answer the questions Goldberg 
and McCann put forth, he would not have been taken away. In fact, if Stanley had 
been an "articulate" character, the play would have been completely different. Pinter 
points out, "If he had cottoned on to the fact that he need only admit to himself what 
he actually is and is not—then Goldberg and McCann would not have paid their visit, 
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or if they had, the same course of events would have been by no means assured" (81). 
Stanley, being who he is, is unable to obtain the self-knowledge that could have saved 
him before it is too late. As Pinter comments, "In the rattle in his throat Stanley 
approximates nearer to the true nature of himself than ever before and certainly ever 
after. But it is too late. Late in the day. He can go no further" (81). The risus purus, 
too, may just be a "rattle in the throat,” but it reveals formerly hidden or unknown 
insights to the self, a function vitally important in a world that preys on the self-
ignorant. It may be unpleasant, it may come to an end, but it is necessary to laugh at 
oneself, before it is too late. 
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Conclusion 
In the old Greek myth, Sisyphus was condemned by the gods for putting death 
in chains; his task of pushing rocks has no point and no end. In modern times, humans 
toil in the same manner, day in day out. In such a world, the absurdity of living strikes 
us as risible and terrible at the same time. Laughter is mixed with tears, and, like 
Sisyphus,s rock, can only roll forth with greater and greater effort. At the end of The 
Myth of Sisyphus, Camus writes, "The struggle itself towards the heights is enough to 
fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy" (111). Now, at the end of this 
dissertation, it is perhaps not so easy for us to draw the same conclusion. 
This study began with a very simple fact: laughter, like humans, changes with 
time. On this premise it set out to leam how the laughter of today sounds, and what 
such laughter says about our generation. We have established that the modern human 
condition was largely shaped by the historical events that took place in the first half of 
the 20th Century, in particular the two world wars. As the mass destruction and 
massacres of the great wars reveal, human reason and action have no direct 
correlation to one's fate; the world, as well as any effort made to live in it, became 
absurd. The Theatre of the Absurd, which aims at illustrating the absurdity of 
mankind's existence, rose in popularity and influence in the period. Its subject matter 
and tragicomic form show that as the world grew more complex, so did people's 
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emotional response towards it. Our study of two representative works of the genre, 
Beckett's Endgame and Pinter's The Birthday Party, shows that laughter is now 
called for in situations where it would have been inappropriate and impossible to 
laugh in the past. This laughter is, as Beckett calls it, the risus purus. 
It has been shown throughout the study that the risus purus is far from a happy 
one. In the past, theories of laughter have explained the pleasure of laughing as 
originating from a sense of superiority, or security in one's logic. For this reason, 
laughter has even been commonly considered an indicator of arrogance and malice. 
However, the same confidence is wholly absent from the laughter of our days. The 
widespread confusion and loss of faith after the Second World War mean that no one 
is in a position to be sure of him- or herself anymore. As a result, the sound of 
laughter becomes hesitant and brief. The laughter of Clov and Nagg of Endgame is 
emitted in short, forced bursts, and Stanley in The Birthday Party laughs nervously 
and hysterically. Moreover, the same laugh can be observed in the audience as they 
watch the unhappy lives on stage. As Wolfgang Iser has noted: "[L]aughter at 
Beckett's plays is always isolated, apparently robbed of its contagious qualities; 
indeed in Endgame and Happy Days it is often accompanied by a sort of shock effect, 
as if the reaction were somehow inappropriate and must therefore be stifled" (64). 
Since the absurd condition being portrayed and acted out is one that everyone shares, 
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the audience cannot easily laugh out of superiority at the characters on stage, as it 
could at a clown. The risus purus is therefore a laugh of uncertainty. 
Paradoxically, it is also a laugh of recognition. As the self and the object of 
laughter appear increasingly similar, the laughing subject comes to realize that his 
laughter at others has always been based upon an unfounded self-confidence. While 
he laughed at others' ignorance, he was unaware of his own and was in turn laughed 
at by others; in fact, he has been laughing at himself the whole time. Naturally, this is 
in no way a happy discovery. Camus argues that Sisyphus is tragic only as long as he 
is aware of his tragedy: "If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero is conscious. 
Where would his torture be, indeed, if at every step the hope of succeeding upheld 
him? The workman of today works every day in his life at the same tasks and this fate 
is no less absurd. But it is tragic only at the rare moments when it becomes conscious" 
(109). The risus purus, arising out of these moments of consciousness, is rightly 
called the pure laugh because it is progressively directed at and folded upon itself. Its 
self-reflexive nature makes it not only a laugh at the unhappy, but also a laugh of the 
unhappy. 
Not only is the risus purus an unhappy laugh, it is one that is always in danger of 
tapering into silence. In different ways, Beckett and Pinter envision the risus purus as 
the end of laughter. In Beckett's plays, it is laughed repeatedly, until the subject and 
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object of laughter grow so similar that there is no one to laugh at, not even the self. 
For Pinter, the main function of the risus purus is to bestow missing self-knowledge 
in a world where ignorance means death. Since a knowing object一in this case the 
s e l f ~ i s not risible, once such knowledge is attained there is no more need to laugh. 
The transitory nature of the risus purus poses the problem of whether it is worth 
laughing. Shane Weller argues that, "If laughter...might have an end, then we are left 
to reflect once again upon the possibility of a last laugh that is not necessarily pure, a 
laugh opening not just onto the posthumous but also onto what might be termed the 
posthumourous'' (133). Here, Weller questions the conclusion that people may be 
tempted to draw at the end of the discussion of the risus purus. The name "pure 
laugh" suggests an overly simple solution man's predicament: self-referential laughter, 
being pure, represents a new, finite goal in the absurd world. However, Weller asks, if 
the risus purus ultimately ends, whether the "posthumourous" world would be a better 
alternative than the current absurd world. Even Simon Critchley, who stands by his 
point that being able to laugh at oneself is ethical, believes that the risus purus is a 
smile, the sound of laughter having diminished (102). The silence after the risus purus 
makes one ask, is it not better to have not laughed it at all? 
On the other hand, both plays studied here, by presenting the dire circumstances 
of not making the effort to laugh at oneself, demonstrate the importance of the risus 
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purus. In Endgame, it is seen that it takes courage to go on laughing——and thus 
living—in an absurd world. It is an obligation that one can choose to fulfill or not. In 
The Birthday Party, the world is seen to be ruthless on those who are unsure of who 
they are, what they want and where they want to go; the self-deluded and self-
ignorant are sooner or later dragged off into the unifying force of the "organization" 
or society, and reduced to zombie-like creatures. The risus purus brings much needed 
knowledge to a world that has long been based on erroneous assumptions about the 
self and others. Camus believes these two things are the weapons of Sisyphus: the 
courage to push on and the recognition of what he is doing allow him to overcome his 
punishment. The silence that follows, Camus believes, is a lesser, necessary evil that 
accompanies such victory: "[T]he absurd man, when he contemplates his torment, 
silences all the idols...There is no sun without shadow, and it is essential to know the 
night. The absurd man says yes and his effort will henceforth be unceasing...[and] he 
knows himself to be the master of his days" (110). By acknowledging his fate, and 
actively choosing to continue with it, Sisyphus is able to regain control over himself, 
thereby obliterating the punishment the gods have inflicted on him. In the same way, 
humans choosing to laugh the risus purus, despite it being a difficult and unhappy 
sound, may well be able to go on in, if not escape, this absurd world. 
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Now, more than half a century after the idea of the absurd was put forth, are we 
living in a laughter-less world? Certainly not, and this could indicate that people have 
failed to, or refused to, join in the unhappy risus purus. Or it could be that we are still 
in the process of refining our laugh. The one thing we can be sure of is that the risus 
purus first produced in the Theatre of the Absurd has a lasting imprint on the way we 
laugh today. Using the popular situation comedy The Office as an example, Critchley 
points out that today's comedy thrives on "situations of embarrassment and pain," and 
the humour it produces compels us to question ourselves and the world around us (qtd. 
in Dent). There is no doubt that, like Sisyphus's endless climb, our struggle has not 
yet come to an end; perhaps it never will. It is not a happy struggle, but like Sisyphus, 
we are only mortal. We cannot bear to release our grip on life. We keep on rolling, 
keep on pushing, keep on laughing. 
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